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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
    
  hether it is science fiction classics such as Huxley’s Brave New World or 
Heinlein’s Starship Troopers, beloved characters like Captain America or the 
more modern versions shown in films such as 2012’s The Bourne Legacy, the 
idea of human enhancement, particularly the enhancement of members of 
the armed forces, is one that has inspired, alarmed and enthralled genera-
tions of authors, readers, movie-goers and real-world scientists alike.1 As 
twenty-first century science takes great strides into making these imagined 
worlds possible, armed forces and their legal advisors need to reflect careful-
ly on the implications of these technologies for the international legal 
frameworks under which they operate. Of particular concern are the law of 
armed conflict and human rights law and their application vis-á-vis techno-
logically enhanced armed force personnel and those who are subjected to 
actions by such personnel.  
                                                                                                                      
1. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932); ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, STARSHIP 
TROOPERS (1959); THE BOURNE LEGACY (Universal Pictures 2012). Marvel Comic’s 
Captain America first appeared in a comic series of the same name in March 1941. See also 
JEFFREY K. JOHNSON, SUPER-HISTORY: COMIC BOOK SUPERHEROES AND AMERICAN 
SOCIETY 34–35 (2012). 
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For the purpose of the present analysis, human enhancement is defined 
as the process of endowing an individual with an ability that goes beyond 
the typical level or statistically normal range of functioning for humans 
generally (or the personal unenhanced capabilities of a particular individu-
al), where the ability is either integrated into the body or is so closely worn 
or connected that it confers an advantage similar to an internal or organic 
enhancement that transforms the person.2 While the science is constantly 
and rapidly evolving, human enhancement technologies can be broadly 
divided into three main categories: biochemical, cybernetic (or brain-
machine interfaces) and prosthetic.3 Although there is a certain amount of 
overlap between the categories (particularly between cybernetics and pros-
thetics), each category raises slightly different legal issues.  
Biochemical enhancement refers to the use of drugs or other pharma-
cological agents to enhance specific functions in the body. In recent years, 
one of the most talked about examples of biochemical enhancement is the 
use of modafinil. A neuro-enhancing drug originally designed for the 
treatment of narcolepsy, in otherwise healthy individuals modafinil acts as a 
cognitive-enhancer, as well as increasing wakefulness and the ability to fo-
cus. Not only have these properties made it the underground drug of 
choice of students taking examinations or writing essays,4 but modafinil has 
also been approved for use by the armed forces of both the United States 
and France, and has been investigated by the United Kingdom and Canada 
(among others) for possible military use.5 While the ability to operate effec-
tively for long periods of time without the need for sleep has long been the 
holy grail of potential military enhancement, biochemical enhancement of 
any kind is not an automatic panacea. It raises complex legal issues in terms 
of the treatment of enhanced soldiers detained by an adversary (for exam-
                                                                                                                      
2. Patrick Lin, Ethical Blowback from Emerging Technologies, 9 JOURNAL OF MILITARY 
ETHICS 313 (2010); Norman Daniels, Normal Functioning and the Treatment-Enhancement 
Distinction, 9 CAMBRIDGE QUARTERLY OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 309 (2000). 
3. One might also point to genetic enhancement or gene therapy as a further possible 
category of enhancement. However, it has not been included in this research, other than 
as a passing reference, as it remains highly speculative. 
4. See Helen Thomson, Narcolepsy Medication Modafinil is World’s First Safe “Smart Drug,” 
THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/aug/20/ 
narcolepsy-medication-modafinil-worlds-first-safe-smart-drug. 
5. William Saletan, The War on Sleep, SLATE (May 29, 2013), http://www.slate 
.com/articles/health_and_science/superman/2013/05/sleep_deprivation_in_the_military
_modafinil_and_the_arms_race_for_soldiers.html.  
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ple, whether sleep deprivation would still constitute inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment of personnel who have taken modafinil or a more permanent 
variation thereof) and an individual’s ability to refuse to be subjected to the 
enhancement, as well as issues regarding the effect on individual accounta-
bility for any actions taken while under the influence of an enhancement.  
The need for sleep is not the only “human failing” that armed forces 
are looking to manipulate with biochemical enhancement. Other drugs are 
being investigated for their utility in reducing the incidence of post-
traumatic stress disorder and the reduction of fear—long implicated in the 
commission of war crimes—as well as reducing traumatic memory for-
mation.6 
The field of cybernetics has also provided many technological advances 
of interest to the military. Brain-machine interfaces, also known as neural 
interface systems, attempt to connect the brain directly to a machine with-
out the need for manual input, such as a keyboard, joystick or other device. 
The interfaces use electrodes (whether surgically implanted in the brain or 
merely resting on the scalp) to record and translate the user’s brain signals 
into commands that operate computer-controlled devices. The technology 
has been used both to actively control an external device (e.g., the ability to 
operate drones with the mind7) and to passively sift information by using 
the brain’s power to unconsciously detect anomalies in large amounts of 
data.8 
Prosthetic technology has made huge strides in the past two years. Sci-
entists have developed prosthetics capable of providing sensory feedback 
                                                                                                                      
6. Michael N. Tennison & Jonathan D. Moreno, Neuroscience, Ethics, and National Secu-
rity: The State of the Art, PLOS (Mar. 20, 2012), http://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/ar 
ticle?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.1001289; Alain Brunet et al., Effect of Post-retrieval Propranolol 
on Psychophysiologic Responding during Subsequent Script-driven Traumatic Imagery in Post-traumatic 
Stress Disorder, 42 JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRIC RESEARCH 503 (2008); Roger K. Pitman et 
al., Pilot Study of Secondary Prevention of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder with Propranolol, 51 BIO-
LOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 189 (2002). 
7. See, e.g., Pierre Bienaimé, Mind-Controlled Drones Are Already a Reality, BUSINESS IN-
SIDER (Oct. 24, 2014) http://www.businessinsider.com/drones-you-can-control-with-
your-mind-2014-10. In fact the technology has spread sufficiently enough that 2016 saw 
the first mind-controlled drone race organised by the University of Florida. 
8. See, e.g., the Cognitive Technology Threat Warning System (CT2WS) developed by 
the U.S. Army and DARPA, which detects brainwaves in order to signal when the sub-
conscious evaluates a visual threat. Neal Ungerleider, DARPA’s Cybernetic Binoculars Tap 
Soldiers’ Brains to Spot Threats, FAST COMPANY (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.fastcom pa-
ny.com/3001501/darpas-cybernetic-binoculars-tap-soldiers-brains-spot-threats. 
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from replacement limbs;9 ways of linking prosthetics using neural interfaces 
or nerve endings to provide thought-controlled movement;10 and visual 
prosthetics to provide augmented vision for those with normal vision and 
restore vision to those who have lost it.11 Armed forces are already using 
exoskeletons such as Lockheed Martin’s Human Universal Load Carrier 
and investigating prosthetics to enable soldiers to target their weapons 
more accurately.12     
In this article, we will address these three forms of military human en-
hancement technologies from an international legal perspective by examin-
ing, first, questions that arise under the law of armed conflict and, second, 
questions that arise under international human rights law. 
  
II. LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
 
A. Weapons Reviews 
 
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon or 
new means and methods of warfare, a State which is a party to Additional 
Protocol I (AP I) is under an affirmative obligation to determine whether 
its employment would be prohibited under the Protocol or any other rule 
of international law applicable to that State.13 A number of States not party 
to AP I, including the United States, have adopted review mechanisms 
along similar lines, albeit as a matter of policy rather than international legal 
                                                                                                                      
9. See David Talbot, An Artificial Hand with Real Feelings, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 
(Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/522086/an-artificial-hand-with-real 
-feelings/. 
10. Id.; Katie Drummond, Prosthetics Breakthrough Might Fuse Nerves with Fake Limbs, 
WIRED (Feb. 27, 2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/02/nerve-prosthetics/. 
11. See, e.g., Philip Sherwell, Blind Man Describes Joy at Seeing Wife for First Time in Decade 
Thanks to “Bionic Eye,” THE TELEGRAPH (LONDON) (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.tele 
graph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/11433149/Blind-man-describes-joy-at-
seeing-wife-for-first-time-in-decade-thanks-to-bionic-eye.html. 
12. Charles Choi, New Army Exoskeleton Makes Soldiers’ Gunshots More Accurate, POPU-
LAR SCIENCE (June 2, 2015), http://www.popsci.com/army-has-exoskeleton-makes-
soldiers-better-shots; Thomas Black, Iron Man Meets HULC as Lockheed Enters Exoskeleton 
Race (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-19/iron-man-
meets-hulc-as-lockheed-enters-exoskeletons-race. 
13. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 36, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
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obligation.14 The first issue that arises in connection with the use of military 
human enhancement technologies is whether and to what extent such 
technologies trigger the requirement of a review as provided for in AP I 
and/or domestic regulations and practice. An answer to that query hinges 
in turn on the question of whether human enhancement technologies—or 
more precisely a given specific human enhancement technology—qualify as 
a weapon or means or method of warfare. 
The term “weapon” is understood to refer to a means of warfare used 
in combat operations that is capable of causing either injury to or death of 
persons, or damage to or destruction of objects.15 As such, a weapon “con-
notes an offensive capability that can be applied to a military object or en-
emy combatant.”16 The term “means of warfare” is broader than a weapon 
inasmuch as it “extends . . . to weapon systems or platforms employed for 
the purposes of attack,”17 and includes associated equipment used directly 
to deliver force during hostilities.18 Means of warfare, and its sub-category 
of weapons, hence apply only in the context of attacks, that is “acts of vio-
lence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.”19 Finally, 
methods of warfare refers to activities designed to adversely affect the en-
emy’s military operations or military capacity and extends to the various 
general categories of operations (bombing, ground, close-air support, etc.), 
                                                                                                                      
14. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, DoDD 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition Sys-
tem, encl. 1, ¶ E1.1.15 (2003), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/500001p. 
pdf. See also OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW 
OF WAR MANUAL §§ 6.2, 19.20.1.2 (2015); Maya Yaron, Address before the Group of 
Experts Meeting on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: Statement on Lethal Auton-
omous Weapons (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpass 
ets)/A02C15B2E5B49AA1C1257F9B0029C454/$file/2016_LAWS_MX_GeneralDebate
_Statements_Israel.pdf. 
15. See PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, MANUAL 
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE r. 1(ff) (2009) 
[hereinafter AMW MANUAL]; PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT 
RESEARCH, COMMENTARY ON THE MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO 
AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE 55 (2010). 
16. Justin McClelland, The Review of Weapons in Accordance with Article 36 of Additional 
Protocol I, 85 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 397, 404 (2003). See also WIL-
LIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 4 (2009). 
17. AMW MANUAL, supra note 15, r. 1(t). 
18. BOOTHBY, supra note 16, at 4 n.7. 
19. Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 49(1). 
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as well as the specific tactics used for attack.20 A common shorthand for 
methods of warfare is “the way in which [weapons] are used” in hostili-
ties.21 
Despite the occasional assertion to the contrary,22 these working defini-
tions suggest that the enhanced human soldier, per se, is not to be consid-
ered a weapon, because it is not the person that constitutes the offensive 
capability that can be applied to military objectives or enemy combatants. 
At the current state of development in the realm of human enhancement 
technologies, a distinction between the human, on the one hand, and the 
enhancement technology, on the other, remains possible since the use of 
the technology does not convert the human into an object that could be 
considered a weapon. While further developments may lead us down a 
path that makes that distinction more complicated, we do not seem to have 
arrived at the crossroads where enhancement technologies transmute hu-
mans into mere objects for the purpose of the law of armed conflict. 
A given human enhancement technology may very well, however, con-
stitute a weapon. This is the case when the technology is capable of causing 
either injury to or death of persons, or damage to or destruction of objects. 
Whether human enhancement technology possesses such offensive capa-
bilities depends on the specific technology in question. On the one hand, a 
clear-cut instance where that question can be answered in the negative is 
biochemical enhancements of members of the State’s own armed forces, 
since the enhancement itself does not cause injury to or death of enemy 
personnel nor damage to or destruction of objects. On the other hand, a 
possible instance where the answer is in the affirmative would be a pros-
thetic enhancement that integrates an offensive capability that is itself a 
weapon, such that the prosthetic is able to fire a munition or has the capa-
bility of a stun gun/taser. 
Furthermore, human enhancement technologies may fall into the no-
tion of means of warfare. An example would be a neural interface system 
                                                                                                                      
20. AMW MANUAL, supra note 15, r. 1(v). 
21. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1402 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & 
Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987); BOOTHBY, supra note 16, at 4 n.7. 
22. See, e.g., PATRICK LIN, MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN & KEITH ABNEY, ENHANCED 
WARFIGHTERS: RISK, ETHICS, AND POLICY 31–32 (2013), http://ethics.calpoly.edu/ 
greenwall_report.pdf.  
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through which weaponized drones are operated since the cybernetic system 
would form part of a weapons system employed for the purposes of attack. 
Last, but not least, human enhancement technologies can be consid-
ered to be methods of warfare if and when their use constitutes an integral 
part of offensive activities at the strategic and tactical levels. In other 
words, if human enhancement technologies were to emerge as organiza-
tional features of, and techniques for, weapons and military units to deliver 
force against opposing armed forces and military objectives, they will trig-
ger the review obligations under Article 36 of AP I and/or under domestic 
regulations. 
What, then, are the main substantive principles of the law of armed 
conflict that would be utilized in such reviews and what idiosyncratic issues 
are raised when these principles are applied to human enhancement tech-
nologies? 
 
B. Superfluous Injury and Unnecessary Suffering 
 
The principle concerning superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering 
(SIrUS) has been recognized as one of the “cardinal principles” of interna-
tional law by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).23 First given form in 
the preamble to the 1868 Declaration of St Petersburg, the principle, which 
bans weapons, projectiles, materiel and methods of warfare that cause su-
perfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, has evolved through its restate-
ment in subsequent law of armed conflict treaties.24 It is also now recog-
nized as a rule of customary law applicable in both international and non-
international armed conflicts.25 However, the difference in language in con-
                                                                                                                      
23. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 238 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]. 
24. For a description of the evolution of the different wording, see W. Hays Parks, 
Conventional Weapons and Weapons Reviews, 8 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAR-
IAN LAW 55, 86–87 n.123 (2005). The most recent versions include Article 35(2) of Addi-
tional Protocol I which provides: “It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and 
material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering.” Identical wording is used in the preamble to the Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137 
[hereinafter  CCW Convention].  
25. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 70 (Jean-Marie Hencka-
erts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CIHL]. 
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secutive legal instruments containing the prohibition26 has made it difficult 
to determine whether the prohibition should be interpreted as prohibiting 
weapons “of a nature to cause” superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering 
(an objective standard) or whether it prohibits those weapons that are “cal-
culated to cause” such injury. That is, the difference is between the neces-
sary effects of the weapon and the intent of the user in designing and using 
it.27  
It is this difference that may prove important not only when looking at 
the impact of the enhancement techniques themselves, but also on any 
countermeasures that will inevitably be developed in order to combat the 
military advantage gained through enhancement. For example, any weapon 
or technique designed to be used against enhanced soldiers that would 
cause greater suffering than is militarily necessary when employed against 
an unenhanced soldier would remain legal as its design and intended appli-
cation is against enhanced soldiers. However, if one adopts an effects-
based approach, the fact that the weapon may be used against unenhanced 
soldiers (perhaps without knowledge of their unenhanced status) would 
constitute a breach of the principle. The better view is that it is the intend-
ed design and normal effects of the weapon which is relevant to any as-
sessment of the SIrUS principle. 
A question also arises as to how the enhancements of soldiers should 
be viewed. For some enhancements, particularly those of a biochemical or 
genetic nature,28 the question may be moot as there is no meaningful dis-
tinction between the soldier and the enhancement. However, for those 
enhancements which are cybernetic or prosthetic in nature, a distinction 
may be made between viewing the enhancement as a specific piece of 
technology separate from the soldier and as the soldier and technology 
combined into an integrated unit. To a certain extent this will be dependent 
on the nature of the enhancement technology in question. As noted above, 
                                                                                                                      
26. Parks, supra note 24. See also BOOTHBY, supra note 16, at 55–61. 
27. An ill-fated project by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 
1997 attempted to introduce an effects-based methodology which relied solely on medical 
evidence and, generally, the worst-case wounding effect of the weapon rather than the 
intended or normal effect. Parks, supra note 24. The ICRC project was heavily criticized 
for ignoring the balance to be struck with military necessity and was eventually withdrawn 
in 2001. Id. 
28. As noted in supra note 3, genetic enhancement is not generally addressed in this 
study, however, it is worth observing in passing that, by definition, any genetic enhance-
ment would not introduce any component external to the human body. 
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the separation in the law of armed conflict between personnel and materiel 
means that enhanced soldiers themselves should not be viewed as weap-
ons; however, that is different from saying that the enhancement should 
not be viewed as a means of warfare. Where the enhancement technology 
is intimately connected with soldiers’ bodies and, in some cases, their 
brains, questions about the appropriate countermeasures that may be taken 
against those enhancements must be considered.  
For example, if a brain-computer interface is viewed as a separate legit-
imate military objective, such that any physiological injury to the soldier 
would be viewed as incidental or collateral to the destruction or neutraliza-
tion of the technology,29 a different calculation may result when viewing 
the soldier and his or her enhancement as an integrated entity. 
Clearly both the enhancement and the soldier may be considered legit-
imate targets. However, if it is permissible to kill the soldier or render him 
or her hors de combat, is it then automatically permissible to overload an im-
planted chip such that it may cause brain damage through an electrical 
overload of neural circuits? There are two issues at play in this situation. 
First, the SIrUS principle generally allows for more serious injuries result-
ing from anti-materiel weapons (for example, the use of depleted uranium 
shells in anti-tank weaponry or incendiary weapons against armored vehi-
cles and fortifications) than it would for weapons typically designed for 
anti-personnel use.30 This is because the military advantage resulting from 
destruction of the tank means the inevitable suffering of the tank’s crew is 
not unnecessary. If one views the neural chip implanted in the brain of a 
cybernetically enhanced soldier as military materiel separate from the indi-
vidual, the permissible level of injury and harm necessitated by the effects 
of a weapon designed to counter that chip may be higher than that of a 
weapon directed at unenhanced personnel. One might argue that any coun-
termeasure used against implantable brain chips is designed to destroy the 
electronics in the implanted chip and any resulting brain damage to the 
soldier would be incidental. But, as Boothby notes in relation to the matter 
                                                                                                                      
29. Note that this does not refer to collateral damage in the sense of proportionality 
or precautions in attack, which refers only to civilians and civilian objects rather than 
military personnel (who, with limited exceptions, may be targeted at all times). 
30. See generally Christopher J. Greenwood, The Law of Weaponry at the Start of the New 
Millennium, in THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 185, 196 
(Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., 1998) (Vol. 71, U.S. Naval War College In-
ternational Law Studies). 
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of the design, purpose and intent of blinding laser weapons, if it can be 
shown that a weapon will necessarily cause blindness when used in the 
circumstances for which it was procured, it may be difficult to show that it 
was not designed for that purpose.31 Any determination would be highly 
fact-specific based on the technology employed, but a similar argument 
may be made for countermeasures which result in permanent brain injury 
or damage to neural circuitry. 
A second point must also be considered. Abhorrence of particular 
types of injury has been the driver for many of the bans of specific weap-
ons or uses of weapons as a method of war.32 For example, blinding laser 
weapons were one of the few weapons that were prohibited before being 
fielded on the grounds that permanently blinding a soldier was superfluous 
and caused unnecessary suffering.33 One can foresee that any countermeas-
ure against implanted brain chips that would result in permanent brain 
damage might also fall within this category.  
However, it should be borne in mind that the two elements of the pro-
hibition on unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury are both compara-
tive terms. Clearly a certain amount (and in some cases a great deal) of suf-
fering and injury is permissible in armed conflict. What is prohibited is 
suffering or injury that is in excess of that necessary to realize a legitimate 
military goal (i.e., military necessity). Thus, if the only way to negate the 
threat posed by enhanced soldiers using implantable brain chips is to over-
load the chips, the resulting brain damage may in fact be necessary and the 
injury not superfluous.  
Ironically, the prohibition against blinding laser weapons noted above 
is unlikely to apply to a soldier with enhanced vision. Certainly those with 
optical implants, or prostheses such as telescoping contact lenses, would 
not be covered by Article 1 of the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons 
which limits the prohibition to “unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye 
or to the eye with corrective eyesight devices.”34 Article 3 specifically excludes 
                                                                                                                      
31. BOOTHBY, supra note 16, at 210–11. 
32. See, e.g., Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weap-
ons, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention on the Prohibition of the Develop-
ment, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, 
Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45. 
33. Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, Oct. 13, 1995, 1380 U.N.T.S. 370. 
34. Emphasis added. A more difficult question may arise where the soldier’s vision 
has been enhanced through genetic means, thus the soldier still relies on his or her naked 
eye. The answer would perhaps depend on the nature and degree of the enhancement. 
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from its ambit any blinding which takes place as an “incidental or collateral 
effect of the legitimate military employment of laser systems used against 
optical equipment.” A question remains about those with vision that has 
been enhanced by other means. For example, Rain Liivoja raises the ques-
tion of whether eyesight which has been augmented through surgical ma-
nipulation would fall within this definition (particularly if it would leave 
vision more susceptible to damage by laser).35 Similar questions may be 
asked of eyesight which has been improved by other methods; for example, 
“biohackers” have been experimenting with increasing their night vision by 
using eye drops made from enzymes derived from deep-sea fish.36 
 
C. Distinction, Proportionality and Precaution Issues 
 
The principle of distinction requires that parties to an armed conflict dis-
tinguish between civilians and civilian objects on the one hand, and com-
batants and military objectives on the other; parties must only direct their 
military operations against the latter.37 Along with the prohibition against 
unnecessary suffering (discussed above), it is considered one of the cardinal 
principles of international humanitarian law.38 The principle of proportion-
ality requires parties to refrain from, or cancel, attacks that are expected to 
cause incidental civilian injury or death, or damage to civilian objects (also 
known as collateral damage) which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated to be gained from the 
attack.39 Compliance with these principles is impacted by both the envi-
ronment and tempo of modern armed conflict, particularly in relation to 
information flows and current limits on the ability of humans to process 
such flows. 
                                                                                                                      
35. Rain Liivoja, Senior Lecturer and Branco Weiss Fellow, Melbourne Law School, 
Remarks at the Swedish Defence University: Bioenhanced Soldiers and the Prohibition of 
Unnecessary Suffering (Sept. 9, 2015).  
36. The group dropped a chlorophyll analog (Chlorin e6) found in plants and some 
deep-sea fish into the eyeballs to give improved night vision. Alejandro Alba, Group of 
Biohackers Test Eye Drops to Give Humans Night Vision, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS (Apr. 5, 
2015), http://nydn.us/1bZtIQa. 
37. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 48; CIHL, supra note 25, rr. 1, 7. 
38. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 23, ¶ 78. 
39. The principle of proportionality runs as a thread through many of the substantive 
provisions of IHL. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 
57(2)(b); CIHL, supra note 25, r. 14. 
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Today’s armed forces deal with vastly more raw data and information than 
at any time in history.40 Headsets, video feeds, instant messaging and radio 
transmissions all add to the cacophony of data that modern military forces 
are facing. This unprecedented amount of raw data helps by permitting 
more accurate targeting and in limiting collateral damage; however, these 
advantages must be balanced against the dangers of soldiers succumbing to 
the resulting “information overload,” which can lead to tragic mistakes.41 
Work is ongoing in several research projects into increasing the brain’s 
ability to multitask in order to be able to utilize the increased amount of 
data without becoming overwhelmed by it. These applied cognition meth-
ods range from attempts to train and “rewire” the functioning of the atten-
tion system to promote “mindfulness,” to heads-up displays that monitor 
brain activity in order to identify threats before they are recognized (or 
overlooked) by the conscious brain.42 
If such methods are successful, the requirement to take all feasible pre-
cautions in attack and to ensure that any targets struck are legitimate mili-
tary objectives will necessarily be revised to take account of what is feasible 
when using the new technology. It should be noted that, as with past tech-
nological developments, most States consider that the law does not impose 
an obligation to acquire such technologies; however, if the State possesses 
the technologies it must field them when feasible.43 In this sense, the use of 
human enhancement technologies may improve compliance with the re-
quirements emanating from distinction and proportionality and their mani-
                                                                                                                      
40. One estimate puts the increase in data flow across the U.S. armed forces at 1,600 
percent since the events of 9/11. Thom Shanker & Matt Richtel, In New Military, Data 
Overload Can be Deadly, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com 
/2011/01/17/technology/17brain.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
41. Id. When U.S. officials looked into an attack by American helicopters that left 
twenty-three Afghan civilians dead, they found that informational overload was an under-
lying cause. Id. 
42. See, e.g., Kalwinder Kaur, New Sensor System Improves Target Detection, AZO ROBOT-
ICS (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.azorobotics.com/News.aspx?newsID=3237 (discussing 
DARPA’s Cognitive Technology Threat Warning System program). 
43. Customary international law places a general requirement on States to avoid and, 
in any event, minimize collateral damage. One of the ways in which this is done is through 
the choice of means and methods of attack. See generally CIHL, supra note 25, r. 17 (dis-
cussing the requirement to take “all feasible precautions” to minimize incidental damage). 
See also HEATHER A. HARRISON DINNISS, CYBER WARFARE AND THE LAWS OF WAR 213–
15 (2012) (discussing new technologies and the choice of weapons as a feasible precau-
tion). 
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festation in the realm of precautions, but does not directly affect the con-
tent of the legal rules. 
Another project currently under investigation by scientists is to inhibit 
or remove fear.44 This is another instance in which the science may have 
interesting consequences for compliance with the principles of distinction, 
proportionality and precautions by allowing the soldier to make decisions 
without being motivated by fear. However, as noted, although such tech-
nologies may increase the likelihood of compliance with the existing laws, it 
will not impact the content of the legal principles themselves.  
At the far (and perhaps speculative) end of the enhancement spectrum, 
exists the possibility of what Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu refer to 
as “moral enhancement.”45 Although fraught with ethical issues and of 
dubious practical use in the environment of an armed conflict, the theory 
of moral bio-enhancement suggests that by amplifying those biological 
factors which underlie a sense of justice and altruism, people will be com-
pelled to act in a way that is morally (and, in the present context, legally) 
right.46 The obvious difficulty would be ensuring that soldiers are trained to 
identify compliance with the law as the morally correct course of action, in 
contrast to increasing the sense of empathy (which is the course of action 
proposed by Persson and Savulescu in order to protect the environment), 
which may result in soldiers unfit for combat. It should be noted that in 
most popular science fiction treatments of the topic, the opposite is usually 
postulated, i.e., the removal or minimization of empathy to create so-called 
“super-soldiers”; it invariably ends badly.47 While a certain level of suppres-
                                                                                                                      
44. JONATHAN D. MORENO, MIND WARS: BRAIN SCIENCE AND THE MILITARY IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY 149–51 (2012). 
45. INGMAR PERSSON & JULIAN SAVULESCU, UNFIT FOR THE FUTURE: THE NEED 
FOR MORAL ENHANCEMENT (2012). While the concept of deliberately manipulating mo-
rality is speculative, it should be noted that the science behind it is not. A recent study 
found that common drugs used in the treatment of depression and Parkinson’s disease 
sway moral decision making when administered to healthy people. Hannah Devlin, Parkin-
son’s and Depression Drugs Can Alter Moral Judgment, Study Shows, THE GUARDIAN (July 2, 
2015), http://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/jul/02/parkinsons-and-depression-dr 
ugs-can-alter-moral-judgement-study-shows.  
46. In their original study, Persson and Savulescu argued for moral enhancement 
based on a need for protection of the natural environment. PERSSON & SAVULESCU, supra 
note 45, at 107–34.  
47. Lack of empathy is also associated with several psychological and personality dis-
orders and is characteristic of psychopathy (or antisocial personality disorder). For exam-
ples in film and television, see, e.g., ROBOCOP (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer et al., 2014) or the 
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sion of empathy is necessarily provided in combat training to produce ef-
fective combatants, permanent biochemical suppression beyond the indi-
vidual soldier’s control risks producing troops that are unable to show the 
required levels of compassion and humanity for the wounded, sick or 
shipwrecked or for those who fall into their power, for example through 
surrender or as detainees. 
 
D. Principle of Protection (Detention and Treatment of the Wounded and Sick) 
 
The principle of protection requires that all persons who are not—or who 
are no longer—taking part in hostilities are treated humanely without any 
adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief or political 
opinions, or any other distinction founded on similar criteria.48 When con-
sidering enhancement technologies, one of the areas in which the principle 
raises particular issues is with regard to detention. These pertain primarily 
to the detainee who has been enhanced, but also in certain circumstances 
to the enhanced detainer. With regard to the latter, one can envisage situa-
tions where the use of particular enhancements by the detaining power on 
their own armed forces would reduce the possibility of abuses occurring 
through moral enhancement as discussed earlier or through methods such 
as optical recording (recording of the video stream of an implanted optical 
prosthetic could provide a view much like that of a headcam video feed) 
designed to increase rule compliance by detention personnel.49 Although 
the use of such technology is likely to raise questions regarding the human 
rights of the personnel involved (particularly with regard to self-
                                                                                                                      
character of Travis Verta in Continuum (Reunion Pictures & Shaw Media, 2012–2015), part 
of a super-soldier program in which the character is implanted with a control chip that 
lowers empathy and compassion while ramping up aggression, making him an unstable 
psychopath. For a general discussion of the popular culture trope of the “super-soldier,” 
see Super Soldier, TVTROPES, http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/SuperSold 
ier (last visited Sept. 29, 2016). 
48. CIHL, supra note 25, r. 88. 
49. It is well established that people comply with rules, and monitor and regulate their 
behavior when they believe that they are under surveillance. See, e.g., Sander van der Lin-
den, How the Illusion of Being Observed Can Make You a Better Person, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 
(May 3, 2011), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-the-illusion-of-being-obs 
erved-can-make-you-better-person/. Jeremy Bentham’s thought experiment of the panop-
ticon and the subsequent discussion by Michel Foucault are classic treatments of the psy-
chological phenomena. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF 
THE PRISON 201 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977). 
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incrimination),50 it does not implicate the law of armed conflict per se. 
Broadly speaking, the law of armed conflict generally does not concern 
itself with the protection of a State’s own forces with regard to detention 
issues. This is subject to only limited exceptions in the area of the protec-
tion of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked in international armed conflicts 
(which extends to all those who are in need of care or assistance) and in 
non-international armed conflicts (where the protection of persons hors de 
combat extends to all members of armed forces).51 
In applying the principle of protection to treatment of detainees, 
whether military or civilian, the law of armed conflict is directly implicated 
in a number of circumstances. 
 
1. Coercion 
  
Article 17 of the Third Geneva Convention (GC III) prohibits any form of 
coercion being inflicted on prisoners of war (POWs) in order to obtain 
information.52 Thus, enhancing a prisoner’s trust in his or her captors, by, 
for example, increasing their levels of oxytocin, a hormone tied to social 
bonding and sometimes referred to as the “cuddle hormone,”53 would fall 
afoul of the sweeping and categorical prohibition of coercion. Coercion of 
                                                                                                                      
50. See discussion infra Section IV.D.  
51. See generally Jann K. Kleffner, Friend or Foe? On the Protective Reach of the Law of Armed 
Conflict, in ARMED CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: IN SEARCH OF THE HUMAN 
FACE 285 (Mariëlle Matthee, Brigit Toebes & Marcel Brus eds., 2013) (noting that the 
protection granted to the wounded, sick and shipwrecked extends to all those who are in 
need of medical assistance or care, provided they refrain from all acts of hostility). 
52. Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 17, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III] (“No physical or mental torture, 
nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them 
information of any kind whatsoever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be 
threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any 
kind.”). 
53. However, recent developments have also shown that oxytocin may have a dark 
side. Researchers have shown that negative or stressful social experiences, such as being 
bullied while certain structures in the brain have been activated by oxytocin, may make 
memories of that experience last long past the event itself and perhaps trigger fear and 
anxiety in the future. Lee Bowman, Oxytocin Studies Show Hormone’s Dark Side, ABC 10 
NEWS (July 28, 2013), http://www.10news.com/lifestyle/health/medical-oxytocin-studies 
-show-hormones-dark-side-07282013. 
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protected persons, e.g., civilian detainees, is similarly prohibited under the 
Fourth Geneva Convention (GC IV).54 
 
2. Experimental Treatments 
 
Second, performing any invasive enhancement technique on detainees will 
be in breach of the laws regulating the treatment of both POWs and civil-
ian detainees. Explicit treaty law found in GC III and GC IV and custom-
ary international law prohibits “[m]utilation, medical or scientific experi-
ments or any other medical procedure not indicated by the state of health 
of the person concerned and not consistent with generally accepted medi-
cal standards.”55 Article 11(2) of AP I further develops that prohibition, 
providing, inter alia, that it applies regardless of the consent of the person 
concerned. Article 5(2)(e) of Additional Protocol II contains broader lan-
guage prohibiting “any medical procedure . . . not consistent with generally 
accepted medical standards” with respect to persons detained in non-
international conflict; however, no specific wording regarding consent is 
included. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, an 
amalgamation of these conventional rules is also reflective of customary 
law applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts.56 
While the general rule is clear, specific scenarios may be envisaged 
where the use of enhancement technology raises interesting legal issues. 
One such issue turns on the experimental nature of the treatment. Whether 
or not a particular enhancement or treatment is deemed to be experimental 
has been the subject of review, particularly after the use of anthrax vaccina-
tions by the U.S. armed forces in the 1991 Gulf War.57 As a general rule, 
                                                                                                                      
54. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
art. 31, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]. It should be 
noted that this is not an absolute prohibition and exceptions exist where explicitly provid-
ed for in the Convention, for example in Articles 79–135, which regulate the treatment of 
internees. 
55. CIHL, supra note 25, r. 92. For specific treaty prohibitions, see Additional Proto-
col I, supra note 13, art. 11; GC III, supra note 52, art. 13; GC IV, supra note 54, art. 32; 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts art. 5(2)(e), June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 609.  
56. CIHL, supra note 25, r. 92. 
57. Catherine L. Annas & George J. Annas, Enhancing the Fighting Force: Medical Research 
on American Soldiers, 25 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY HEALTH LAW AND POLICY 283 
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however, if the treatment has been approved by the treating State’s stand-
ards authority, the procedure or treatment will not be viewed as experi-
mental.58  
 
3. Solving Medical Problems through Enhancement 
 
Another scenario raising interesting legal issues occurs when a detainee has 
a medical problem or injury that can best be resolved by a form of en-
hancement. One can imagine a situation in which wounded or sick enemy 
personnel require treatment and the standard treatment provided by the 
detaining power to its own forces would involve the use of an enhance-
ment technique to block pain, promote rapid healing or enhance the im-
mune system.  
The United States’ Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) currently has research programs in photobiomodulation to ac-
celerate wound healing, vaccines that block pain within seconds and chem-
ical cascades to stop bleeding within minutes.59 In addition to these en-
hancements designed to address specific issues, DARPA has also been 
seeking nanoplatforms that can be introduced into the body for medical 
diagnostics, as well as being used to monitor and treat a broad range of 
diseases.60 Although these programs are primarily focused on treatment 
rather than enhancement, the technologies described can last for a pro-
longed period of time (the effects of the pain vaccine last for thirty days) or 
                                                                                                                      
(2009); Efthimios Parasidis, Human Enhancement and Experimental Research in the Military, 44 
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 1117 (2012). 
58. This function is performed for example by the Food and Drug Administration in 
the United States and Läkemedelsverket in Sweden. Rules relating to experimental treat-
ments and trials are coordinated across the European Union and conducted under EU 
directives administered by the European Medicines Agency in accordance with standard-
ized internationally recognized “good clinical practice” rules. See, e.g., Commission Di-
rective 2005/28/EC of April 8, 2005, 2005 O.J. (L 91) 13 (laying down principles and 
detailed guidelines for good clinical practice as regards investigational medicinal products 
for human use) and incorporated directives. 
59. JOEL GARREAU, RADICAL EVOLUTION: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF ENHANC-
ING OUR MINDS, OUR BODIES—AND WHAT IT MEANS TO BE HUMAN 27–29 (2005). 
60. DARPA News, DARPA Effort Targets Illness Faster, Safer and More Effectively, 
ASD(R&E) S&T NEWS BULLETIN 6 (June 15, 2012), http://www.acq.osd.mil/chieftechn 
ologist/publications/docs/ST_NewsBulletin-V2-I24(15JUN2012).pdf; In Vivo Nanoplat-
forms (IVN), DARPA, http://www.darpa.mil/program/in-vivo-nanoplatforms (last visited 
Mar. 21 2016). 
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can be used prophylactically (in the case of the diagnostic nanoplatforms), 
and thus fall within the enhancement paradigm. While these research pro-
grams are designed to ensure that U.S. personnel are diagnosed and treated 
effectively, their utility in maintaining the health of detainees confined in 
close quarters is immediately apparent.  
As noted above, customary international law and Article 11 of AP I, 
protect any person who is in the power of an adverse party, or who is in-
terned, detained or otherwise deprived of liberty as a result of an armed 
conflict. It is prohibited to subject such a person “to any medical proce-
dure which is not indicated by the state of health of the person concerned 
and which is not consistent with generally accepted medical standards 
which would be applied under similar medical circumstances to persons 
who are nationals of the party conducting the procedure and who are in no 
way deprived of their liberty.”61 What constitutes generally accepted medi-
cal practice will be determined by medical ethics and the standards adopted 
by professional medical bodies, for example, the World Medical Associa-
tion and the World Health Organization.62 
In the case of the enhancement techniques being researched by 
DARPA, although the particular treatment would be indicated by the med-
ical state of the detainee, intervention would not necessarily conform to 
generally accepted medical standards owing to its innovative status. How-
ever, if national authorities for the detaining State have approved the tech-
nology or technique for treatment of its own soldiers and/or citizens as a 
standard treatment and it conforms to the best medical interests of the 
patient, it may be argued that in those circumstances its use would be con-
sistent with the law. In the commentary on the Copenhagen Guidelines on 
the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations, it is noted 
that, although medical assistance should, wherever possible, be conducted 
with the consent of the wounded or sick detainee, medical actions to pre-
serve the health of the detainee may be justified even where the detainee 
                                                                                                                      
61. Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 11(1). 
62. See, e.g., World Medical Association, Declaration of Geneva (1948); World Medical 
Association, International Code of Medical Ethics (1949); World Medical Association, 
Regulations in Times of Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence (1956). See also 
World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki, Ethical Principles for Medical Re-
search Involving Human Subjects (1964) (addressing experimental treatments). 
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refuses to provide consent.63 It should be noted that this is not the case 
with surgical interventions, where the person concerned may refuse an 
operation even if the surgeon considers it essential to the person’s surviv-
al.64 
In the case of POWs, nanoplatforms designed for medical diagnosis 
may not only be permitted, but may also be preferred. Article 31, GC III 
requires that POWs undergo medical inspections at least once a month, 
specifically requiring that the most efficient methods available for the de-
tection of contagious diseases, as well as for the supervision of the general 
health, nutrition and cleanliness of prisoners, be employed.65 With technol-
ogy costs inevitably decreasing over time, nanoplatforms may well become 
the most efficient way of monitoring the health of detainees.  
 
4. Detaining Enhanced Personnel 
 
A third scenario emerges when personnel who have previously been en-
hanced are detained. For example, if a detainee is reliant on periodic inges-
tion of a particular substance to maintain their enhancement, management 
of the withdrawal of the individual from that substance may be problemat-
ic. What legal consequences may flow from such a situation?  
Under GC III, parties are required to repatriate seriously wounded or 
sick POWs to their own country.66 This applies in particular to those whose 
mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely diminished; those 
who are incurable; those who have recovered, but whose mental or physi-
cal fitness seems to have been gravely or permanently diminished; and 
                                                                                                                      
63. THE COPENHAGEN PROCESS ON THE HANDLING OF DETAINEES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE COPENHAGEN PROCESS: PRINCIPLES & GUIDE-
LINES 14–15 (2012), http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-
and-diplomacy/Copenhangen%20Process%20Principles%20and%20Guidelines.pdf. 
64. Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 11(5). 
65. GC III, supra note 52. Article 31 provides: 
 
Medical inspections of prisoners of war shall be held at least once a month. They shall in-
clude the checking and the recording of the weight of each prisoner of war. Their purpose 
shall be, in particular, to supervise the general state of health, nutrition and cleanliness of 
prisoners and to detect contagious diseases, especially tuberculosis, malaria and venereal 
disease. For this purpose the most efficient methods available shall be employed, e.g. pe-
riodic mass miniature radiography for the early detection of tuberculosis. 
 
66. Id., art. 109. 
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those who require treatment and are unlikely to recover within a year.67 
Prisoners who enter detention while enhanced, and subsequently lose their 
enhanced capabilities, may appear to have a permanent diminishment in 
their physical or mental capabilities. For detaining forces with no 
knowledge of an individual soldier’s baseline levels (i.e., the standard unen-
hanced level of whatever capability or function is being measured for that 
particular individual), forming an opinion about the difference between an 
enhanced soldier and their unenhanced state will necessarily be based on 
generalities. However, the purpose of the provisions is to facilitate the 
timely repatriation of gravely sick or wounded soldiers who can no longer 
return to active service. If the enhancement technology is such that without 
their drugs or other means soldiers will return to a normal baseline state of 
an unenhanced but otherwise fit-for-duty soldier, they would not qualify 
for repatriation. However should the enhancement be such that lack of 
maintenance would result in grave and permanent damage to the baseline 
status of the prisoner and the detaining power is unable to provide the ap-
propriate treatment in its detention facilities, the prisoner must be trans-
ferred to a military or civilian medical facility where the appropriate treat-
ment can be provided.68 
 
III. HUMAN RIGHTS OF ENHANCED HUMANS 
 
At the outset of this section, it is pertinent to make a point about the sub-
ject of human rights. Despite the enhanced status of members of the mili-
tary or any other person who is the subject of an enhancement (whether 
pharmacological, cybernetic, genetic or otherwise), they remain, at their 
core, fundamentally human. The preamble of all the universal human rights 
instruments refer to “all members of the human family” and in their open-
ing articles address the rights contained therein to “all human beings.”69 
Like the universal instruments, regional human rights instruments also use 
                                                                                                                      
67. Id., art. 110. 
68. Id., art. 30. 
69. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/3/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [here-
inafter ICESCR]. 
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inclusive language encompassing all persons or every human being,70 or in 
the case of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) secure 
rights to “everyone.”71 Lest the argument be made that a genetic change, 
technological implant or biological modification somehow remove the en-
hanced soldier from the human family, it should be recalled that the juris-
prudence of human rights bodies, such as the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), have found breaches of protected rights of those whose 
brains are not yet fully formed (in cases involving an unborn child), those 
who have physiological differences, those who have genetic or chromoso-
mal abnormalities and those whose bodies have been changed by medical 
intervention.72  
In determining the contours of human rights for members of the 
armed forces, the approach of the Inter-American human rights bodies,73 
the European Union and the ECtHR has been to view them as citizens in 
uniform. The jurisprudence of the latter court is particularly rich in this 
respect, recognizing that human rights law applies in principle to members 
of the armed forces, but also acknowledging in a 1976 judgment that when 
interpreting and applying the ECHR “the Court must bear in mind the 
particular characteristics of military life and its effects on the situation of 
individual members of the armed forces.”74 The principle has been applied 
in subsequent cases, with the ECtHR observing that the extent of protec-
tion given to members of the armed forces must take into account the 
characteristics of military life, the nature of the activities they are required 
                                                                                                                      
70. See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 
123 [hereinafter ACHR]; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 
1520 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter ACHPR]. 
71. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
72. For example, the following European cases all feature complaints in which the 
subjects of the rights discussed are still regarded as rights holders. X v. United Kingdom, 
App. No. 8416/79, 19 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 244 (1980) (observing that appli-
cation of certain rights prenatally cannot be excluded); H.L. v. United Kingdom, 2004-IX 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 197 (complainant with severe autism and learning difficulties); Zarzycki v. 
Poland, App. No. 15351/03 (2013) (ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
117210 (complainant with forearm prostheses); Tešic v. Serbia, App. Nos. 4678/07, 
50591/12 (2014) (ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-140771 (complainant 
with a pacemaker).  
73. See, e.g., J.S.C.H. & M.G.S., Case 12.689, Inter-Am. Comm’n on H.R., Report No. 
80/15, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.156, doc. 33 (2015). 
74. Engel and Others v. Netherlands, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976). 
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to perform and the risk arising from those activities.75 This approach has 
led the ECtHR to provide the State with a considerable degree of latitude 
to restrict the human rights of the members of its armed forces during war 
or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation.76 The Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom, on reviewing the approach of the ECtHR 
to members of armed forces, observed: 
 
These comments, however brief, do seem to make it clear that it would 
not be compatible with the characteristics of military life to expect the 
same standard of protection as would be afforded by article 2(1) [of the 
ECHR] to civilians who had not undertaken the obligations and risks as-
sociated with life in the military. That is plainly so in the context of the 
exercise of military discipline over members of the armed forces when 
they are on active service. It is hard to see why servicemen and women 
should not, as a general rule, be given the same protection against the risk 
of death or injury by the provision of appropriate training and equipment 
as members of the police, fire and other emergency services. But it is dif-
ferent when the serviceman or woman moves from recruitment and train-
ing to operations on active service, whether at home or overseas. It is 
here that the national interest requires that the law should accord the 
widest measure of appreciation to commanders on the ground who have 
the responsibility of planning for and conducting operations there.77 
 
From a practical standpoint, it should be noted that armed forces com-
posed of volunteers, as opposed to conscript armies, face additional pres-
sure to respect the human rights of their members in order to attract and 
retain the desired level and quality of recruits. Although an adult volunteer 
can be taken to have consented to certain aspects of military life and the 
resulting curtailment of particular rights by the very act of enlistment, the 
consent does not amount to a carte blanche waiver of all aspects of the 
human rights applicable to the individual.78   
International human rights fall into four basic categories: non-
derogable rights, rights which may be derogated from in war or public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation, absolute rights and qualified 
                                                                                                                      
75. See, e.g., Grigoriades v. Greece, 1997-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 
76. PETER J. ROWE, THE IMPACT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ON ARMED FORCES 59 
(2006). 
77. Smith and Others v. Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41, ¶ 71. 
78. ROWE, supra note 76, at 9–13. 
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rights. Qualified rights are rights which may be limited by law in certain 
specified circumstances. Both derogable rights and qualified rights may be 
significantly curtailed in respect of members of the armed forces. This is 
particularly the case in times of armed conflict as many of the limitation 
clauses contained in the relevant treaties specifically provide for limitations 
and restrictions for reasons of national security and/or public safety. Abso-
lute rights (such as the prohibition against torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment) remain in full force at all times, unaffected by mem-
bership in an armed force or the existence of an ongoing armed conflict or 
other situation affecting national security. 
With these preliminary observations in mind, we will now address 
some of the human rights implications that flow from human enhancement 
technologies. 
 
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN ENHANCEMENT 
TECHNOLOGIES 
 
It is clear that different enhancement technologies will impact the human 
rights of individual soldiers in different ways. This section briefly examines 
the impact of these technologies on some of the substantive rights set out 
in international human rights instruments.  
 
A. The Right to Life 
 
The right to life applies to soldiers both in peacetime and during armed 
conflict, although in the latter case the application is substantially curtailed 
by both jurisdictional and contextual matters. While members of the armed 
forces fall within the jurisdiction of their own State—whether serving at 
home or abroad—incidents involving third parties who are subjected to the 
actions of enhanced personnel deployed outside their own country will be 
governed by the rules on the extraterritorial application of human rights 
law, which in turn depend on whether an individual is subject to a State’s 
jurisdiction.79   
                                                                                                                      
79. Jurisdiction in the context of human rights law carries a special meaning, on which 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR is still evolving. At present, for individuals to fall within 
the jurisdiction of a State, either the territory in which they are located, or the individuals 
themselves, must be under that State’s effective control. Case law establishes that individ-
uals held in detention by a State’s armed forces are within the effective control of that 
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The right to life is a non-derogable right, except in respect of deaths re-
sulting from lawful acts of war.80 However, as Rowe points out, “[t]he con-
cept of lawful acts of war is concerned with the obligations a State owes to 
those (normally non-nationals) against whom it is engaged in an interna-
tional armed conflict and not its own soldiers.”81 The right to life not only 
prohibits States from taking a life without justification, but also implies a 
duty on the part of the State to establish a framework of laws and proce-
dures to protect life to the greatest extent reasonably possible under the 
circumstances.82 It is in this obligation that the contextual restrictions on 
the right to life for members of the armed forces become pertinent. Sol-
diers are expected (and expect) to risk—and even sacrifice—their lives if 
necessary in the course of an armed conflict; however, this expectation 
does not entirely preclude liability on the part of the State with respect to 
the right to life of its own soldiers.  
The UK Supreme Court had occasion to consider whether, and to what 
extent, the right to life in Article 2 of the ECHR imposes positive obliga-
tions on the government to prevent the deaths of its own soldiers.83 The 
Court concluded that, while it must avoid imposing positive obligations on 
                                                                                                                      
State. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99. As a general proposition, 
the United States does not consider that human rights law applies extraterritorially: See, e.g., 
United States of America, Fourth Periodic Report of the United States to the U.N. Hu-
man Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/4, at 142 (May 22, 2012). That under-
standing has been reviewed by the United States in recent years and it now acknowledges 
the Torture Convention “applies to certain areas beyond” its sovereign territory, and more 
specifically to “all places that the State party controls as a governmental authority.” U.N. 
Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Combined Third to Fifth Periodic 
Reports of the United States of America, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/3-5, at 3 (Dec. 19, 
2014). 
80. See ICCPR, supra note 69, arts. 4, 6; ECHR, supra note 71, arts. 2, 15; ACHR, supra 
note 70, arts. 4, 27. The ECHR specifically exempts lawful acts of war under the deroga-
tions provision of Article 15(2). In contrast, both the ICCPR and ACHR are expressed in 
terms of a prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of life; death arising from lawful acts of war 
are generally not considered arbitrary and therefore would not violate the right in the first 
place, rather than requiring a derogation. 
81. ROWE, supra note 76, at 137. It should be noted that this is not exclusively the 
case. 
82. The duty to take positive measures to protect the right to life derives both from 
specific statements in the articles of the relevant international treaties that the right should 
be protected by law and the general duty of States to ensure the rights recognized in the 
various instruments. 
83. Smith and Others, supra note 77. 
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the State which are unrealistic or disproportionate in connection with the 
planning or conduct of military operations during armed conflict, it must 
give effect to those obligations where it would be reasonable to expect the 
individual to be afforded the protection of Article 2.84 The Court then ex-
cluded from the ambit of the Article decisions taken at a high level of 
command that are closely linked to the exercise of political judgment and 
issues of policy, as well as decisions taken by those actively engaged in di-
rect contact with the enemy. However, the Court was prepared to find 
there was room for claims to be brought in the middle ground, while ac-
knowledging a wide margin of appreciation was to be granted to authorities 
and to those actively engaged in armed conflict.85 The Court concluded no 
hard and fast rules could be established; that each case would require an 
exercise of judgment based on its facts.86 
The ECtHR itself has yet to consider a case based on the use of exper-
imental technologies by the military, or indeed the extent to which the right 
to life in Article 2(1) offers any protection to armed forces members active-
ly engaged in armed conflicts. However, it has been generally recognized 
that the right to life must be balanced against the public interest of the 
State in conserving the fighting force. In the operational context, the State 
possesses a wide margin of appreciation in respect of its determination of 
the national interest. As noted above, the margin is significantly curtailed 
when personnel are engaged in training, as opposed to active warfighting.87  
                                                                                                                      
84. Id. ¶ 76. 
85. The concept or doctrine of the “margin of appreciation” describes the amount of 
latitude that the court will grant to States before disallowing measures put in place by the 
State that interfere with an individual’s rights. The doctrine encapsulates the Court’s 
recognition that the measures that a State may consider necessary to interfere with an 
individual’s human rights may differ from State to State even within democratic societies. 
It also recognizes that national governments are best placed to determine what is neces-
sary for that State rather than an international court. Although primarily a function of the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the rationale underlying the doctrine has been applied by 
other international human rights bodies such as the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights and the Human Rights Committee. See, e.g., Proposed Amendments to the Natural-
izations Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4184, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 4, ¶ 62 (Jan. 19, 1984); U.N. Human Rights Committee, 
Hertzberg et al. v. Finland, Communication No. R.14/61, U.N. Doc. A/37/40, at 161, ¶ 
10.3 (Apr. 2, 1982). 
86. Smith and Others, supra note 77, ¶ 76. 
87. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 67–76 (setting out the relevant case law of the Court).  
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In relation to enhancement technologies, the right to life may be in-
fringed where the use of a particular technology poses a risk to the individ-
ual soldier that results in his or her death. For example, fatal side effects of 
experimental enhancement technologies may involve an infringement of 
this right. Military experimentation, that is, the use of armed forces person-
nel as human test subjects, is replete with examples of horrific experiments 
conducted on often unknowing and/or objecting personnel.88  
The right to life may also be impacted indirectly by enhanced soldiers 
who cause the wrongful death of others while under the influence of their 
enhancement, whether occurring during training or while engaged in mili-
tary operations For example, in 2002, in what has become known as the 
Tarnack Farms friendly-fire incident, a U.S. Air Force F-16 pilot dropped a 
bomb on Canadian troops conducting a firing exercise, believing them to 
be Taliban fighters.89 The pilots were returning to base following a ten-
hour night patrol when they reported what they believed to be surface-to-
air fire. In the incident that followed, a combination of reckless behavior, 
bad communication and the fog of war led to one of the pilots dropping a 
five-hundred pound laser-guided bomb on the Canadian troops, killing 
four and wounding eight others. During the subsequent investigation and 
disciplinary proceeding, the pilots raised as part of their defense the fact 
that they had been told by superiors to use amphetamines during their mis-
sion and had taken dextroamphetamine prior to the incident. Although the 
defense was not accepted and the two pilots involved were held responsi-
ble for not following standard operating procedures and the rules of en-
gagement, a number of medically qualified commentators have noted that 
the use of amphetamines for longer missions required of pilots by the Air 
Force is likely to have led to the pilots’ failure to wait for confirmation of 
the targets’ identity and to believe they needed to act in self-defense.90 Not 
only are States responsible for the acts of their armed forces, but they also 
                                                                                                                      
88. See generally Annas & Annas, supra note 57; Parasidis, supra note 57; George J. An-
nas, Protecting Soldiers from Friendly Fire: The Consent Requirement for Using Investigational Drugs 
and Vaccines in Combat, 24 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE 245 (1998). 
89. For a summary of the incident, see Annas & Annas, supra note 57, at 293–97. As 
this only indirectly impacts the right to life, no further discussion will be included here.  
90. See, e.g., id. at 296. Note, however, that others maintain that it should have im-
proved the pilots’ performance. Thom Shanker & Mary Duenwald, Bombing Error in Af-
ghanistan Puts a Spotlight on Pilots’ Pills, NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 19, 2003), http://www.ny 
times.com/2003/01/19/national/19SPEE.html. 
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have an obligation where they know of a risk to the lives of those under 
their jurisdiction.91 
It should be noted that, as with any other possible breach of the right 
to life, the right may also be infringed by a State’s failure to investigate ef-
fectively.92 Investigations must be independent, thorough and prompt, with 
a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to 
ensure accountability.93 These obligations are unchanged with respect to 
deaths that involve human enhancement technologies.  
 
B. Bodily Integrity, Torture, and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
 
The right of bodily integrity refers to the collection of rights (including the 
right to life) concerned with the inviolability of the human body and right 
of the person to determine what may be done to it. Referred to in slightly 
different terms under different treaty regimes, these rights incorporate se-
curity of the person,94 the right to humane treatment,95 the prohibition 
against slavery,96 and the prohibition against torture and inhuman or de-
grading treatment,97 as well as the prohibition against medical and scientific 
experimentation without freely given consent.98 The prohibitions against 
slavery, and torture and inhuman or degrading treatment are absolute 
rights; States may not, under any circumstances, have recourse to such 
treatment or condone it.99 States must, therefore, also take measures to 
                                                                                                                      
91. See, e.g., Osman v United Kingdom, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 115–22; Gonzalez 
(“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009) (Garcia-Sayan, J., concurring, ¶¶ 3–15). 
92. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 6: (Right to Life), U.N. 
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, at 129, ¶ 4 (2004). 
93. See generally Al-Skeini, supra note 79 (holding that deaths must be investigated effec-
tively and impartially); Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, ¶¶ 172–77 (July 29, 1988) (holding that States have the duty to inves-
tigate the right to life irrespective of the identity of the perpetrator).  
94. UDHR, supra note 69, art. 3. 
95. ACHR, supra note 70, art. 5. 
96. UDHR, supra note 69, art. 4; ICCPR, supra note 69, art. 8; ECHR, supra note 71, 
art. 4; ACHR, supra note 70, art. 6. 
97. ICCPR, supra note 69, art. 7; ECHR, supra note 71, art. 3; ACHR, supra note 70, 
art. 5(2). 
98. ICCPR, supra note 69, art. 7. 
99. With respect to the obligation not to condone, see, e.g., Articles 4–8 of the Con-
vention against Torture, which require States to make torture a crime under national laws 
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protect its service personnel against such treatment.100 These prohibitions, 
as well as the prohibition against medical and scientific experimentation 
without free consent, are also non-derogable rights under both the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the ECHR.101 
Enhancement of military personnel raises interesting questions with re-
spect to the right of bodily integrity on two different levels. The first is the 
right of the soldier to consent to or refuse the enhancement and, second, 
what effects the enhancement may have on the permissible treatment of 
the soldier once enhanced.  
The issue regarding the right to refuse an enhancement will largely de-
pend on the nature and status of the technology involved. While approved 
medicines may become part of the standard pre-deployment medical re-
gime in the same manner as conventional vaccines, more experimental 
technologies may raise legitimate concerns for the personnel involved. In-
deed, many of the issues raised by the use of experimental technologies 
have been previously raised and debated with respect to the mandatory 
administration of anthrax vaccines which had not yet been approved by the 
States’ drug approval agencies.102 Whether a member of the armed forces 
has the right to refuse such vaccines will depend on the extent of his or her 
right to bodily integrity. The soldier who refuses the vaccine may be pre-
vented from deploying with his or her unit as a potential risk to military 
efficiency, the lack of inoculation making him or her unfit for military ser-
vice in a particular region. For example, in 2003 approximately forty Aus-
tralian servicemen and women who were deploying to the Middle East 
were ordered to return to Australia after refusing anthrax inoculations en 
route.103 No disciplinary measures were taken in that case; however, in 
                                                                                                                      
and extradite or prosecute anyone present on their territory that is suspected of having 
committed an act of torture. States have a duty to investigate allegations of torture 
promptly, impartially and effectively (Articles 12 and 13) and where substantial evidence is 
found, perpetrators of torture must be punished. Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 
85.  
100. Committee of Ministers, Human Rights of Members of the Armed Forces, Recommen-
dation CM/Rec(2010)4 (Feb. 24, 2010), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1590149& 
Site=CM. 
101. ICCPR, supra note 69, art. 4(2); ECHR, supra note 71, art. 15. 
102. See, e.g., ROWE, supra note 76, at 47.  
103. Anthrax Jab Side-Effects Withheld, BBC NEWS (Feb. 21, 2004), http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3509037.stm.  
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some States refusal has resulted in disciplinary action being taken against 
the soldier involved.104  
Certainly where the enhancement remains experimental, the soldier will 
retain more rights to refuse the enhancement than if it has been approved 
for use by the appropriate State authority.105 Regardless of the legal issues 
involved, medical ethics require informed consent of the subject for any 
experimental treatment. However, serious concerns have been raised by 
some authors who argue that true informed consent has been impossible to 
achieve in situations involving the military hierarchy,106 citing examples 
where pressure (either real or perceived) from senior ranking officers for 
soldiers to comply with requests or, in some cases, direct orders to subject 
themselves to medical treatment, have removed any genuine ability to re-
fuse.107 
The right to bodily integrity is also often expressed as a function of the 
right to privacy. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR has provided leading 
judgments on the scope and contours of the right. The right to privacy 
requires that a State respect everyone’s “private and family life, their home 
and correspondence.”108 The Court has noted that the term “private life” 
includes the physical and psychological integrity of a person, as well as “as-
pects of an individual’s physical and social identity.”109 Courts in other ju-
                                                                                                                      
104. See, e.g., Court-Martial for Refusing Anthrax Shot, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 5, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/05/nyregion/court-martial-for-refusing-anthrax-shot. 
html. 
105. Such approval is granted in the United States by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion, the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency in the United Kingdom 
and the Läkemedelsverket (Medical Products Agency) in Sweden. 
106. See Jo Bird & Greta Bird, Human Rights and the Military: The “Chemical Soldier,” 30 
ALTERNATIVE LAW JOURNAL 81, 81–85 (2005); Annas, supra note 88, at 253 n.42 (In the 
accompanying text the author points out that, although in principle the soldiers had the 
right to refuse a botulinum toxin vaccination, the right was not communicated to them in 
the field.). 
107. For example, the informed consent form used by the U.S. Air Force specifically 
states that although taking Dexedrine is voluntary, refusal to take the amphetamines may 
result in a pilot being grounded. Such an outcome would have a major impact on a pilot’s 
career. See Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, NAVMED P-6410, Performance Mainte-
nance during Continuous Flight Operations: A Guide for Flight Surgeons 21 (NAVMED 
P-6410), Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, 1 Jan 2000). 
108. ECHR, supra note 71, art. 8. See also ICCPR, supra note 69, art. 17; ACHR, supra 
note 70, art. 11; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union arts. 7–9, Dec. 18, 
2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364). 
109. Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 154, ¶ 61. 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2016 
462 
 
 
 
 
 
 
risdictions have also viewed the right to refuse medical treatment as a func-
tion of the right to privacy.110 Given that the right to privacy also concerns 
the physical integrity of a person, the right may be implicated where the 
armed forces require members to undergo enhancements as a requirement 
for deployment or to otherwise carry out their duties. Issues have arisen in 
the past where the State has required its soldiers deployed in an area in 
which it is suspected that the enemy may use chemical or biological weap-
ons to take medically prescribed tablets or inoculations to protect them 
against the effects of such weapons.111 The right to privacy has also been 
implicated in cases dealing with physical intrusions into the body, for ex-
ample, in the anthrax medication cases discussed above.112  
The right is not absolute either for civilians or members of the armed 
forces. For example, under the ECHR, States are permitted to restrict the 
right of privacy provided that the restriction is in accordance with the law, 
pursues a legitimate aim (for example, national security) and is necessary in 
a democratic society.113 
As to the permissible treatment of individual soldiers once enhanced, 
the subject of sleep deprivation provides an interesting example of the type 
of issue raised. Sleep deprivation has been denounced on multiple occa-
sions by U.N. human rights bodies,114 including the Committee against 
Torture, judicially recognized by the ECtHR as a form of inhuman and 
                                                                                                                      
110. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976) (basing a decision 
to terminate treatment, inter alia, on a constitutional right to privacy). 
111. ROWE, supra note 76, at 47. 
112. Id. 
113. ECHR, supra note 71, art. 8(2) (“There shall be no interference by a public au-
thority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the pro-
tection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”). 
Note that the jurisprudence of the court has also established that any interference with 
individual rights must also be proportionate to the legitimate aim sought to be realized. 
For an overview of the principle of proportionality as applied by human rights treaty bod-
ies, see Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, Proportionality, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 446–68 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2013). 
114. See, e.g., Theo van Boven (Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, In-
human or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), Sixth Report pursuant to General Assembly 
Resolution 58/164 and Human Rights Commission Resolution 2004/41, U.N. Doc. A/59/324 
(Sept. 1, 2004); U.N. Committee against Torture, Report of the Committee against Tor-
ture, ¶¶ 56, 257, U.N. Doc. A/52/44 (Supp.) (Sept. 10, 1997).  
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degrading treatment,115 and prohibited as a method of interrogation by the 
Supreme Court of Israel,116 among others.117 In the case of the ECtHR, the 
Court recognized that sleep deprivation caused “intense physical and men-
tal suffering,”118 which surpassed the minimum level of severity to fall with-
in the scope of inhuman treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR. However, 
the assessment of the minimum level of severity is relative and depends on 
all the circumstances of a case, such as the nature and context of the treat-
ment, the manner and method of its execution, its duration, its physical and 
mental effects, and, in some cases, the gender, age and state of health of 
the victim.119 Enhancement techniques which reduce the need for sleep or 
counteract the harmful effects of sleep deprivation in military personnel are 
seen as the holy grail of many defense-funded research projects. Should a 
technique be developed which allows personnel to require less sleep, or 
drugs developed which counteract the deleterious effects of sleep depriva-
tion—lack of cognitive ability, mental agility etc.—it may call into question 
the accepted categorization of sleep deprivation as a prohibited technique 
constituting inhuman treatment or in some cases torture, at least in terms 
of the prolongation and levels of deprivation for soldiers who are so en-
hanced. 
  
C. Privacy, Thought and Expression 
 
Human enhancement technologies which mediate and/or manipulate in-
formation between the outside world and the brain (such as cybernetic 
implants or optical prosthetics) or which inhibit the brain’s ability to make 
free choices (such as moral engineering) will also impact the human rights 
of those using them. In particular, the rights to privacy and freedom of 
thought, conscience, religion and expression find new challenges in these 
emerging technologies. 
                                                                                                                      
115. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 58, ¶ 167 (1978).  
116. HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel 53(4) 
PD 817, ¶¶ 31–32 (1999) (Isr.), reprinted in 38 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1471 
(stating that where sleep deprivation amounts to an end in itself for the purposes of break-
ing the suspect, rather than a side effect, it is prohibited).  
117. See, e.g., R (on the application of Binyam Mohamed) v. Secretary of State for For-
eign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 65, [2011] Q.B. 218 (Eng.). 
118. Ireland v. United Kingdom, supra note 115, ¶ 167. 
119. Id. ¶ 162; Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32, ¶ 100 
(1989).  
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In the fields of cybernetics and prosthetics, privacy issues may also be 
raised by ocular implants or any other monitoring device which is connect-
ed to a system that has a data recording capability or provides for upload to 
a network or the cloud. While external devices such as helmet cameras or 
the dual-use Google Glass and its competitors can be removed by the user, 
implant technology cannot and would therefore have the capacity for 24/7 
image capture or recording. Strict policies will need to be in place in devel-
oping the implant technology and interface and in its use to protect the 
privacy of both the user and those with whom they come in contact. Clear-
ly, the recording and outside observation of private family moments will 
breach the soldier’s right to a private family life.120 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), ICCPR and 
some regional human rights treaties provide everyone (including members 
of the armed forces) the “freedom of thought, conscience and religion.”121 
While it has thus far been exclusively used in cases dealing with freedom of 
religion and the associated right to express that religion, in Kokkinakis v. 
Greece the ECtHR noted “it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, 
sceptics and the unconcerned.”122 Although specific limitations may be 
placed on the external manifestation of this right within the context of mili-
tary life,123 the protection in relation to the internal dimension of freedom 
of thought—the forum internum—is absolute and not subject to State inter-
ference. Indeed, Article 18(2) of the ICCPR specifically provides that “[n]o 
                                                                                                                      
120. Although privacy is a qualified, rather than absolute, right and therefore subject 
to the normal requirements of limitations on interferences with rights (lawful, necessary in 
a democratic society to achieve a legitimate aim and proportionate to that aim), it is diffi-
cult to see what legitimate aim might be served that would make routine outside observa-
tion of intimate family moments necessary or proportionate. 
121. UDHR, supra note 69, art. 18; ICCPR, supra note 69, art. 18; ECHR, supra note 
71, art. 9. Other regional human rights instruments refer solely to freedom of conscience 
and religion. Although it should be noted that while the ACHR deals solely with con-
science and religion in Article 12, freedom of thought is included with freedom of expres-
sion in the Article 13. ACHR, supra note 70. The ECHR provides that “[e]veryone has the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to 
change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and ob-
servance.” ECHR, supra, art. 9. 
122. Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12, ¶ 31 (1993). 
123. As long as the restrictions comply with the requirements of, for example, Article 
9(2), ECHR that they are properly prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim (e.g., national 
security) and are necessary in a democratic society. 
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one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or 
to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.” At first blush this right does not 
appear to impact enhancement technologies; however, the advent of brain-
machine interfaces and the suggestion of moral enhancement raise the pos-
sibility of quite literally affecting a person’s ability to think freely. Persson 
and Savulescu’s controversial argument for moral enhancement of human 
beings goes directly to the very heart of the values protected by this right.124 
“At its most basic, . . . the right seeks to prevent state indoctrination of 
individuals by permitting the holding, development, and refinement and 
ultimately change of personal thought, conscience and religion.”125 If per-
sonnel are prevented from freely making moral judgments because of a 
drug administered to them by State authorities, their fundamental freedoms 
may well be violated.  
While the current iteration of the problem sounds futuristic, the EC-
tHR has in fact had occasion to address the problem of thought control in 
the past. In the Kokkinakis judgment, the Court appeared to suggest that a 
breach of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion could 
occur in cases of severe spiritual coercion or brainwashing, although the 
Court suggested that it would also consider such acts to be in breach of 
Article 3 (prohibiting torture, inhuman or degrading treatment) of the 
ECHR.126 The ECtHR has also recognized the particular vulnerability of 
                                                                                                                      
124. PERSSON & SAVULESCU, supra note 45. As noted above, Persson and Savulescu 
make the claim in relation to environmental damage and climate change (although they 
also mention the threat of nuclear war), but there is the potential for application to the 
military in the moral enhancement of soldiers, particularly, although not exclusively, with 
those involved in detention after the scandals arising in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. 
While abuse of detainees offers the best and most obvious example of immoral behavior, 
there are potentially many others which could affect the way soldiers operate, such as in 
targeting. However, enhancement of empathy could, in fact, make targeting decisions, 
particularly assessment of proportionality, harder on soldiers since it would be much more 
difficult for soldiers to accept and live with any collateral damage. 
125. JIM MURDOCH, PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CON-
SCIENCE AND RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 18 
(Counsel of Europe Handbooks, 2012), http://www.coe.int/t/dgi/hr-natimplement/ 
Source/documentation/hb09_rightfreedom_en.pdf. 
126. Kokkinakis, supra note 122. 
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military personnel to be influenced by senior officers by virtue of the mili-
tary’s hierarchical structure.127 
Closely linked to the right of freedom of thought is the right to free-
dom of expression. For example, Article 10 of the ECHR provides: “Eve-
ryone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include free-
dom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. . . .”128 Other interna-
tional and regional human rights instruments contain similar or broader 
wording.129 Under the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), 
where freedom of thought and expression are contained in the same article, 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has recognized the closely 
linked “dual aspect” of the right,130 and interpreted it more broadly as a 
right of substantive access to information, rather than mere prevention of 
interference.131 Needless to say, in respect of its application to members of 
the armed forces this right is often qualified.132 Although none of the hu-
man rights instruments specifically mention the armed forces per se, most 
provide that the right may be restricted for reasons (among others) of na-
tional security.133 The exception is most commonly used in the military 
context for such things as preventing publication of information (usually 
books or papers) by members of the armed forces that may compromise 
national security.134 However, where soldiers are equipped with cybernetic 
implants (brain-machine interfaces) which mediate between an information 
source and the brain, the right to “receive and impart information without 
interference from a public authority” gains a new dimension.  
                                                                                                                      
127. Larissis and Others v. Greece, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 362. See also FRANCISCO 
FORREST MARTIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW: 
TREATIES, CASES AND ANALYSIS 747 (2006). 
128. Emphasis added. 
129. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 69, art. 19; ICCPR, supra note 69, art. 19; ACHR, su-
pra note 70, art. 13; ACHPR, supra note 70, art. 9. 
130. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice 
of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opin-
ion OC-5/85, Inter-Amer. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 5, ¶ 30 (Nov. 13, 1985).  
131. Rayes v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Amer. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 151, ¶¶ 61–103 (Sept. 19, 2006). 
132. ROWE, supra note 76, at 55–58. 
133. Interestingly, this limitation does not occur in the ACHPR. ROWE, supra note 76, 
at 56. Additional limitations include that such restrictions must be prescribed by law and 
necessary in a democratic society. 
134. ROWE, supra note 76, at 57–58. 
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There are many technologies which provide additional information to 
armed forces personnel, e.g., heads-up displays for fighter pilots and the Q-
warrior augmented reality helmets from BAE Systems,135 which are unlikely 
to impact this right. However, there are technologies in development which 
are intended to filter data in order to prevent information overload.136 This 
may be particularly relevant where the implant or prosthetic removes visual 
information from view, or is designed to provide targeting information to 
the soldier. According to reports, software has been devised in Germany 
which allows for the deletion of visual information by smart glass or con-
tact lens.137 As one futurist was quoted as saying, “[s]o if you decide you 
don’t like homeless people in your city, and you use this software and im-
plant it in your contact lenses, then you won’t see them at all.”138 One can 
imagine that States may be tempted to remove “extraneous” information 
from their already information-overloaded troops to enable them to con-
centrate on the task at hand.  
While it is likely that the interference with this right will be governed by 
the national security exception (where available), law and policy makers 
should be aware of the impact of the technology on freedom of expression 
to ensure that a balance between the two is preserved. In particular, there 
should be a recognition that this type of technology will impact not only on 
the human rights of the personnel involved, but also the ability of those 
personnel to comply with such law of armed conflict principles as precau-
tions in attack and proportionality. 
 
  
                                                                                                                      
135. See Allen Mcouffee, At Last, a Google Glass for the Battlefield, WIRED (Feb. 24, 
2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/02/battlefield-glass/. 
136. See, e.g., the DARPA-initiated augmented cognition program. COMMITTEE ON 
OPPORTUNITIES IN NEUROSCIENCE FOR FUTURE ARMY APPLICATIONS, OPPORTUNITIES 
IN NEUROSCIENCE FOR FUTURE ARMY APPLICATIONS 117 (2009), http://www.ncbi. 
nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK207983/. 
137. Evgeny Morozov, The Perils of Perfection, NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 3, 2013, at SR1, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/opinion/sunday/the-perils-of-perfection.html?_r 
=0; Edward Champion, Thirty-five Arguments against Google Glass, RELUCTANT HABITS (Mar. 
14, 2013), http://www.edrants.com/thirty-five-arguments-against-google-glass/. 
138. Parag Khanna & Ayesha Khanna, The Pleasure and Danger of Augmented Reality, BIG 
THINK, http://bigthink.com/hybrid-reality/the-pleasure-and-danger-of-augmented-reality 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2016). 
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Fair Trial Rights 
 
The right of everyone, including members of the armed forces, to a fair 
trial is provided by, inter alia, Articles 10 and 11(1) of the UDHR, Article 9 
of the ICCPR, Articles 5 and 6 of the ECHR, Articles 8 and 25 of the 
ACHR, and Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. These guarantees provide that in the determination of their civil 
rights and obligations, or of a criminal charge against them, everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal established by law. In addition to the specif-
ic rights enumerated in the text of the articles, additional guarantees have 
been developed through the jurisprudence of courts and tribunals.139 Addi-
tional rights are also found elsewhere in the conventions: no punishment 
without law (Article 7, ECHR; Article 9, ACHR) and the right not to be 
tried or punished twice for the same offense (ne bis in idem) (Article 4, Pro-
tocol 7 to the ECHR140).  
Military justice is a complex field in which a great variety of national 
systems operate.141 States vary in the way they differentiate between military 
disciplinary matters and criminal offenses, in the type and composition of 
the courts dealing with military offenses, and in the putative independence 
of the staff investigating, prosecuting or reviewing cases vis-á-vis the chain 
of command. Each type of system raises different challenges for the human 
rights of armed forces members; however, the impact of human enhance-
ment technologies on fair trial rights guaranteed under the various human 
rights treaties is the same regardless of the military or civilian status of the 
court. That said, there are certain technologies which may have an impact 
                                                                                                                      
139. For example, under the European system these include the right to have access 
to a court, the right to remain silent and not incriminate oneself, the right to equality of 
arms and the right to an adversarial proceeding. See generally Human Rights Committee, 
General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a 
Fair Trial, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (Aug. 23, 2007). 
140. Protocol 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 22, 1984, E.T.S. 117.  
141. For a description of different types of military justice systems and the human 
rights of the armed forces in the States participating in the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe, see OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS, ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, HANDBOOK 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS OF ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL 
(2008). 
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on fair trial rights that are more likely to be initially implemented by the 
military. 
Articles 14(3)(g) of the ICCPR and 8(2)(g) of the ACHR contain an ex-
press right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess guilt. 
Within the European system the right to silence and the privilege against 
self-incrimination are not found in the text of the ECHR, but have been 
developed through the case law of the ECtHR.142 The Court has noted that 
“the . . . right to silence and the right not to incriminate oneself are general-
ly recognized international standards which lie at the heart of a fair proce-
dure under Article 6.”143 As always, it will depend on the nature of the 
technology involved; however, it is foreseeable that certain brain-machine 
interfaces and implants (such as ocular implants) may impact on this right 
for military personnel. For example, if an ocular implant is recording and 
transmitting everything that a soldier sees, a question arises over whether 
this will impact the privilege against self-incrimination in any subsequent 
proceeding regarding incidents portrayed in the footage. Generally speak-
ing, the privilege against self-incrimination can operate to prevent the use 
of compelled information in subsequent criminal proceedings.144 Objective 
evidence such as video footage (for example, from a helmet or body cam-
era) does not fall within this right, as it is not communicative evidence and 
can be compelled to be provided by the user for a legitimate purpose. Ar-
guably, however, one might draw a distinction between those implants that 
require some form of cognitive processing of the data by the individual and 
those which are merely a direct video feed and operate in much the same 
way as a helmet camera. 
More traditional protections of this right, namely against the use of 
more directly coercive practices by the government to extract self-
incriminatory evidence, will also adapt to the new technologies involved. 
Evidence obtained through the use of biochemical enhancers, such as oxy-
tocin and other chemicals intended to make detainees more cooperative, 
will raise the same legal issues from a human rights perspective as the use 
                                                                                                                      
142. See, e.g., K v. Austria, App. No. 16002/90, (ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-57830 (noting the ECHR’s right against self-incrimination). 
143. Heaney and McGuinness v. Ireland, 2000-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 419, ¶ 40.  
144. Note that the exercise of this privilege differs across jurisdictions. In respect of 
the ICC, see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 67(1)(g), 69(7), July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. For an account of the English domestic legal tradition, see PAUL 
ROBERTS & ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ch. 4 (2004). 
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of truth serums has in the past.145 They are also likely to be open to the 
same criticisms, i.e., they make a person more susceptible to outside sug-
gestion, thereby increasing the likelihood that the person would recall false 
memories and thus falsely incriminate themselves (or others). Use of bio-
chemical enhancers would be specifically prohibited by the fundamental 
rights and freedoms contained in the Swedish Instrument of Government, 
which specifically provides protection against any “medical influence aimed 
at extorting or suppressing statements.”146 While the Swedish approach is 
generally considered to be reflective of customary law,147 it is interesting to 
note that in March, 2013, a judge in the United States approved the use of 
“truth serum” on James Holmes, the defendant in the Aurora, Colorado 
mass shooting incident.148  
Other enhancements which affect memory recall will also create issues 
for fair trial rights. For example, research is ongoing into the use of beta-
blockers and other pharmaceuticals to reduce the impact of traumatic 
memory formation.149 Other proof-of-concept research is currently being 
carried out involving the manipulation of mouse memories to add emo-
tional content.150 Both projects have potential military application in the 
                                                                                                                      
145. See, e.g., John M. MacDonald, Truth Serum, 46 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW, 
CRIMINOLOGY, AND POLICE SCIENCE 259 (1955) (on the effectiveness of “truth” serums 
generally); The Legal Prohibition against Torture, HRW (last updated June 1, 2004), https://w 
ww.hrw.org/news/2003/03/11/legal-prohibition-against-torture#serums. See generally Jal-
loh v. Germany, 2006-IX Eur. Ct. H. R. 281, ¶¶ 103–23 (ruling that the use of a drug to 
compel evidence—in this case an emetic—violated the right to a fair trial). 
146. REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] [CONSTITUTION] 2, 5 (Swed.), reprinted in The Instrument 
of Government, SVERIGES RIKSSDAG, https://www.riksdagen.se/en/How-the-Riksdag-wo 
rks/Democracy/The-Constitution/The-Instrument-of-Government/ (then follow “The 
Instrument of Government” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 10, 2016). 
147. See, e.g., the broad wording of Article 55(1)(b) of the Rome Statute, which is 
considered reflective of customary international law and provides that a person “shall not 
be subjected to any form of coercion, duress or threat, to torture or to any other form of 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” (emphasis added). 
148. Ed Pilkington, Judge Approves Use of “Truth Serum” on Accused Aurora Shooter James 
Holmes, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/ 
mar/12/judge-approves-truth-serum-james-holmes. Truth serum was approved for the 
purposes of determining the insanity or otherwise of the accused in the event that he 
claimed an insanity defense. 
149. Jim Giles, Beta-blockers Tackle Memories of Horror, NATURE, 436, 448–49 (28 July 
2005). 
150. Nick Bilton, Computer-Brain Interfaces Making Big Leaps, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 4, 
2013, at B4, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/disruptions-rather-than-time-co 
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reduction of incidents of post-traumatic stress disorder in military person-
nel returning from combat tours. However, the fact that a soldier has un-
dergone any form of memory manipulation will create doubt as to their 
reliability as a witness, either in their own defense or against another in a 
court action. 
 
V. HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS OF REINTEGRATING ENHANCED  
SOLDIERS INTO CIVILIAN SOCIETY 
 
Once enhanced soldiers have completed their service and seek to return to 
civilian life, attention will have to be given to both the rights of the soldiers 
returning and to the wider societal impact of the presence of enhanced 
veterans in the population. 
 
A. Removal of Enhancements 
 
One of the major issues to be addressed will be what happens to the en-
hancements of enhanced soldiers once they leave the armed forces. Lin and 
his co-authors have raised the question of whether soldiers should be re-
quired to have any enhancements removed before integration back into 
civilian society so as not to give enhanced personnel an unfair advantage in 
the civilian workplace.151 However, the legal situation regarding removal of 
enhancements is far from certain. For example, the ownership of medical 
devices (and even of the data received from them) differs across jurisdic-
tions. From an ownership perspective, there may be a difference between 
implantable technology and prosthetics (albeit intimately connected ones). 
While some technologies may rightly be considered materiel of the armed 
forces and be required to be relinquished on exit from the armed forces—
perhaps to be replaced by a more civilian-appropriate version, for example, 
in the case of a forearm prosthesis—other technologies may more properly 
be viewed as having become the property of the individual soldier.152 
                                                                                                                      
mputers-might-become-panacea-to-hurt/ (reporting that the scientists were able to add 
negative emotion to a neutral memory and make a mouse believe that it had been given an 
electric shock at a different location from that where the shock had actually occurred). 
151. LIN, MEHLMAN & ABNEY, supra note 22, at 71. This issue is discussed in more 
detail in Section V.B infra. 
152. To take a current example, pacemakers and implantable defibrillators become 
the property of the patient. 
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Careful research will be required to establish the physiological effects 
of the removal of any enhancements embedded within the body. For ex-
ample, any cybernetic or brain-machine interface implanted in the brain 
may disrupt the normal functioning of neural pathways as the brain adapts 
to the new technology.153 It is possible that subsequent removal of the im-
plant may cause neurological damage if the brain is unable to reestablish its 
previous pathways or otherwise compensate for the loss of the technology. 
Thus, the removal of the enhancement could potentially violate the sol-
dier’s rights to bodily integrity and an adequate standard of healthcare,154 or 
in severe cases amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. 
In addition to any physiological harm, close attention must also be paid 
to the psychological effects of removing enhancements. Depending on the 
type of enhancement and the length of time the soldier has been using it, 
enhanced abilities may become part of the soldier’s personal identity such 
that removal of them would be unduly traumatic. Any removal may impact 
the rights to bodily integrity and privacy (in respect of the soldier’s psycho-
logical identity), and in some cases cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 
Thus, care must be taken even when replacing a militarily-optimized en-
hancement for a more civilian-appropriate one to ensure similar functional-
ity is provided. For example, a cutting-edge, mind-controlled forearm pros-
thetic, which has the ability to relate sensation back to the brain, should not 
be replaced with an inert mechanical claw.  
 
B. Societal Rights and Discrimination 
 
The concern about the impact of reintegrating military veterans into civil-
ian society extends also to their treatment by mainstream society. If en-
hanced veterans were to present a significant threat to unenhanced workers 
in terms, for example, of lost job opportunities, the societal tendency to 
                                                                                                                      
153. Functional plasticity, that is the brain’s (limited) ability to adapt and form new 
neural pathways, is well documented, particularly in instances of traumatic stress. Given 
that members of the armed forces are routinely deployed into situations which expose 
them to high levels of traumatic stress, this is of increased importance to military patients.  
154. UDHR, supra note 69, art. 25; ICESCR, supra note 69, art. 12. See also European 
Social Charter art. 13(1), Feb. 26, 1965, 529 U.N.T.S. 89 (ensuring a right to healthcare). 
Healthcare is understood to include the preservation of mental and physical health 
through medical services. See also DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND LE-
GAL AFFAIRS, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, HUMAN RIGHTS OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED 
FORCES 61, CM/Rec, at 4 (2010). 
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discriminate against perceived outsiders is likely to emerge. Of course, such 
a reaction will be based in part on the level of penetration of the particular 
technology from the military into the civilian society; those enhancements 
which began as civilian technologies and were subsequently adopted by the 
military may be better accepted.  
States have a duty to secure to their citizens (including members of the 
armed forces) their rights and freedoms without discrimination. For exam-
ple, the UDHR provides for “equal protection against any discrimination in 
violation of this Declaration.”155 Article 26 of the ICCPR provides, “the 
law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and 
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status.” The ECHR contains almost identi-
cal wording with the addition of “association with a national minority” as a 
protected class.156 The ACHR refers to “other social condition” rather than 
status.157 
Discriminating against an enhanced veteran would not necessarily con-
stitute prohibited grounds for discrimination under any of the applicable 
human rights instruments. However, while enhancement does not fall with-
in any of the named categories, none of the lists of grounds for discrimina-
tion in the conventions are exhaustive.158 In Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Peder-
sen v. Denmark the ECtHR suggested that “status” referred to “a personal 
characteristic by which persons or groups of persons are distinguishable 
from each other.”159 Although it may be dependent on the particular tech-
nology involved, enhancements may well come within that definition and 
fall into the “or other status” category set out in the conventions. It should 
                                                                                                                      
155. UDHR, supra note 69, art. 7. See also Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Nov. 4, 2000, E.T.S. No. 
177 (creating a “free-standing” non-discrimination provision). 
156. ECHR, supra note 71, art. 14. 
157. ACHR, supra note 70, art. 1(1). 
158. See, e.g., Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No. 20: Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (art. 2, para. 2, of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/GC/20, ¶¶ 15, 20–35 (July 2, 2009) (discussing the need for a flexible approach 
to “other status” and further examples of prohibited grounds of discrimination including, 
inter alia, disability, nationality, age and health status). 
159. Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 
24–25, ¶ 56 (1976). 
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be noted that the principle of non-discrimination is not an absolute right. 
For example, it will not be violated if the distinction between individuals in 
analogous situations has an objective and reasonable justification, which 
must be assessed in relation to the aim and effects of the measures taken.160 
The aim must be legitimate and the measures proportionate to that aim. 
Thus, for example, a person denied employment because of an optical im-
plant capable of image recording may not have a claim he or she has been 
discriminated against if the job involves working with sensitive or classified 
information. Preventing the risk that the implant may provide access to 
information to third parties is likely to be considered a legitimate objective 
and the decision to employ a person without such an enhancement is likely 
to be considered an appropriate and proportionate solution. 
 
VI. ACCOUNTABILITY AND INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY  
 
A. State Responsibility 
 
A State considering the use of enhanced soldiers must also consider its 
responsibility for the acts of its organs under the doctrine of State respon-
sibility.161 The State remains responsible for acts carried out by State organs 
(including individuals) in their official capacity regardless of whether that 
State organ was acting ultra vires or contrary to instructions, or if the State 
knew of its actions.162 The same rules apply to persons and entities that are 
empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority, but who are 
not State organs (for example, State contractors, such as prison guards, 
who are engaged to provide services).163 
                                                                                                                      
160. HUMAN RIGHTS OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, supra note 154. 
161. While this article deals primarily with the impact of enhancement of the armed 
forces, the issues addressed apply equally to members of the intelligence services and other 
State organs. To cite a fictional example, the main characters in the Bourne series of mov-
ies (played by Matt Damon & Jeremy Renner) featuring enhanced individuals have both 
worked in different programs run by the intelligence services of the United States. 
162. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 
7, Report of the International Law Commission, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 
10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 
YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4 
/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2).  
163. Id., arts. 5, 7. 
 
 
 
Soldier 2.0 Vol. 92 
 
475 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The rules of State responsibility deal with the responsibility of States 
for internationally wrongful acts attributable to them. It thus involves two 
elements: first, that the act is attributable to the State and, second, that the 
act constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.164 Hu-
man enhancement technologies may play a role in determining whether or 
not this obligation has been breached. That is, an illegal act committed by 
an enhanced soldier might not be an internationally wrongful act because 
of the circumstances of his or her enhancement.  
As a matter of general public international law, the law of State respon-
sibility does not concern itself with subjective criteria such as the mental 
element, but is premised on the idea of objective liability.165 It is the act or 
omission of the State which matters, regardless of any intent or fault. How-
ever, whether or not there has been a breach of a primary rule may depend 
on the intention or knowledge of the relevant State organs or agents.166 For 
example, the crime of genocide requires the specified acts to be committed 
with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group.167 If the 
enhancement technology under consideration has destroyed the individu-
als’ capacity to form the requisite intent,168 it will not be possible to estab-
lish that the breach of an international obligation by the State has oc-
curred.169 
Likewise with primary obligations containing a knowledge requirement; 
in the Corfu Channel case, Albania was held responsible to the United King-
dom for damage to two Royal Navy warships which struck mines laid in its 
territorial waters, because it knew or ought to have known of the mines’ 
presence and failed to warn other States.170 When dealing with the subject 
                                                                                                                      
164. Id., art. 2. 
165. See generally JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 
60–61 (2013). 
166. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT, AND COMMENTARIES 81–82 (2002). 
167. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2, 
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
168. See Section VI.B infra for a discussion of individual responsibility. 
169. On the question of the need, or lack thereof, to attribute intent in the context of 
State responsibility for genocide, see Marko Milanovic, State Responsibility for Genocide, 17 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 553, 553–604, 567–69 (2006); Andre 
Nollkaemper, Concurrence between Individual Responsibility and State Responsibility in International 
Law, 52 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 615, 633 (2003). 
170. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9). 
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of human enhancement, and particularly with cybernetics, it must be asked 
what it means to know something.   
Similar questions arise with a State that provides aid or assistance or di-
rection and control in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by 
another State.171 For the providing State to be held responsible, the aid, 
assistance, direction or control must be provided with knowledge of the 
unlawfulness of the subsequent act by the second State. For example, in 
the Bosnian Genocide case, the ICJ found that while there was little doubt 
that the atrocities committed in Srebrenica were committed with resources 
possessed as a result of the “general policy of aid and assistance” by Serbia 
and Montenegro, it was not established that Serbia was aware that the 
“perpetrators had the specific intent characterizing genocide.”172 The 
standard required by Article 16 (with respect to aiding and assisting) of the 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility of States is that the assisting State 
had specific knowledge, crucially, of an internationally wrongful act with a 
high degree of particularity,173 and that it intended to facilitate the wrongful 
conduct through its aid or assistance. Therefore, if a State supplies en-
hancement technologies to another State for the purposes of enhancing 
their armed forces in such a manner that renders the soldiers incapable of 
determining the wrongfulness of their conduct, any subsequent breach of 
an international obligation by the receiving State would not engage the 
responsibility of the assisting State unless at the time the assistance was 
provided it had specific knowledge of the particular abuses or wrongful 
acts that would be committed. 
 
B. Individual Responsibility 
 
Questions of responsibility and autonomy may also be asked at the indi-
vidual level. For example, if a soldier’s fear or remorse for their past actions 
is removed or diminished through pharmacological enhancement, what 
does that mean for the autonomy of the individual combatant? An essential 
                                                                                                                      
171. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 141, arts. 16, 17. 
172. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 422 
(Feb. 26). 
173. Id. ¶¶ 423–24. See also Christian Dominicé, Attribution of Conduct to Multiple States 
and the Implication of a State in the Act of Another State, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY 286 (James Crawford, Alain Pellet & Simon Olleson eds., 2010). 
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and related question is how does that impact the individual’s responsibility 
for any breaches of the law of armed conflict on the battlefield while so 
enhanced? 
 
1. Free Will 
 
At the extreme end of enhancement technology lays the risk that certain 
enhancements could interfere with the free will of the individual being en-
hanced. Such a determination would interfere with the individual’s capacity 
to form the mens rea necessary to be held responsible for his or her actions 
under international criminal law. Article 30 of the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC) sets out the customary law standard for 
the mental element required when no specific rules regulate the mens rea,174 
indicating a person will only be held criminally liable for their acts where 
they are committed with intent and knowledge. The intent requirement can 
be divided into two parts. First, the person must intend to perform the 
specific act, i.e., they “mean to engage in the conduct” described in the 
crime.175 Second, if the definition of the crime requires that a particular 
consequence results from the act (for example, the death of a person), the 
perpetrator must either “mean to cause that consequence” or at least be 
“aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.”176  
The use of human enhancement technologies may affect these re-
quirements in a number of ways. For example, where prosthetics are con-
trolled by cybernetic implants, such as an advanced military exoskeleton, 
the implant may be subject to interference either by the soldier’s State or 
through a third party hacking the device. This would provide a defense 
similar to that of automatism, which occurs when the person involved 
proves it was an involuntary action over which he or she had no control.177 
It is not just the control of prosthetics which may be compromised. 
Research conducted at the University of Washington on human-to-human 
interfaces enabled a researcher to control the hand movements of a col-
                                                                                                                      
174. Rome Statute, supra note 143, art. 30. See also GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 104–6 (2d ed. 2005). 
175. Rome Statute, supra note 143. 
176. Id.  
177. See generally WERLE, supra note 153, at 105 (noting that automatism prevents 
criminal responsibility for crimes under international law). 
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league across campus.178 As the experiment routed the control commands 
via the Internet, the controlled subject could have been geographically situ-
ated anywhere in the world, including a war zone. Control over the finger 
by the researcher involved in the study might equally be control over a 
soldier’s finger on a weapon’s triggering mechanism. This would negate the 
intention of the soldier not to perform the specific act, provided the will of 
the controller to move the finger can overrule the will of the soldier not to 
move it. 
Likewise, moral enhancement, even if done for allegedly virtuous pur-
poses, may well be seen as interfering with the free will of an individual to 
make their own choice by making the thought of acting in a contrary man-
ner to what has been determined to be moral repugnant to them. The po-
tential for abuse is obvious. Whether or not military personnel who have 
undergone such enhancement remain individually responsible for their 
actions will necessarily need to be determined on the basis of the en-
hancement technology and its capacity to interfere with their capability to 
appreciate the unlawfulness of their actions. In the case of specific instanc-
es of interference, forensic psychologists who deal with matters of free will 
in criminal cases not involving enhancements will need to be augmented by 
those with particular knowledge of the technologies concerned. 
It is possible that enhancement technology may also impact on the 
knowledge requirement of individual responsibility. Where a crime requires 
the existence of certain circumstances, it is normally sufficient in establish-
ing liability to prove that the perpetrator was aware that those circumstanc-
es existed.179 For example, attacking a person in the knowledge that they 
are hors de combat requires merely an awareness of that person’s inability to 
continue to participate in combat, rather than a correct legal assessment of 
their legal status. Where a crime requires knowledge of a descriptive mate-
rial fact, sensory perception is all that is required. Naturally, enhancement 
techniques may either enhance or filter sensory perception, and will thus 
need to be taken into account when determining the individual’s 
knowledge of the material facts, particularly where the relevant enhance-
ment allows the user to interface directly with vast amounts of raw data.  
                                                                                                                      
178. Doree Armstrong & Michelle Ma, Researcher Controls Colleague’s Motions in 1st Hu-
man Brain-to-Brain Interface, UW TODAY (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.washington.edu/ 
news/2013/08/27/researcher-controls-colleagues-motions-in-1st-human-brain-to-brain-
interface/. 
179. Rome Statute, supra note 143, art. 30. See also WERLE, supra note 153, at 105. 
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Where the material fact in question is normative in nature, i.e., it re-
quires a value judgment, it is sufficient if the perpetrator knows the funda-
mental factual circumstances and comprehends the significance or social 
relevance of the incriminating conduct.180 It is possible that enhancement 
technologies such as moral enhancement may interfere with the ability of 
the individual to comprehend the social relevance of the facts; however, it 
seems likely that any such enhancement technique would be banned for 
that very reason before ever being fielded. 
One final point to note is that many crimes contain a required specific 
mental element. For example, “intentionally directing attacks against the ci-
vilian population,”181 “willful killing”182 and “willfully causing great suffer-
ing”183 under the Rome Statute. Likewise, its Elements of Crimes contain 
references to the mental element such as “knew or should have known”184 
and “was aware of,”185 inter alia, which may be affected by the use of human 
enhancement technologies. Each of these mental elements will need to be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis in light of the impact of the particular 
technology on the individual’s ability to meet those requirements. 
 
2. Excused and Diminished Responsibility 
 
The Rome Statute excludes a defendant from criminal responsibility where 
that person suffers from a “mental defect” or “was in a state of intoxica-
tion that destroys that person’s capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or 
nature of his or her conduct, or to control his or her conduct to conform 
to the requirements of the law.”186 The intoxication defense does not pre-
                                                                                                                      
180. For example, those elements of crime involving value judgements such as “in-
humane” or “severe.” See WERLE, supra note 153, at 105–6; COMMENTARY ON THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 902 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 
2008).  
181. Rome Statute, supra note 143, art. 8(2)(b)(i) (emphasis added). 
182. Id., art. 8(2)(a)(i) (emphasis added). 
183. Id., art. 8(2)(a)(iii) (emphasis added). 
184. International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes art. 8(2)(b)(vii), U.N. Doc. 
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000) (emphasis added). 
185. Id., art. 7(1)(e) (emphasis added). See WERLE, supra note 153, at 106–9. 
186. Rome Statute, supra note 143, art. 31(1)(b) (But excepting situations when “the 
person has become voluntarily intoxicated under such circumstances that the person 
knew, or disregarded the risk, that, as a result of the intoxication, he or she was likely to 
engage in conduct constituting a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.”).  
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suppose a specific substance (for example, both drink and drugs are cov-
ered); however, it is intended to apply only to external substances intro-
duced into the body.187 The use of pharmaceutical enhancements may fall 
within this category, as by analogy may other enhancements such as brain-
machine interfaces where they have the same effect as that necessary for a 
mental defect or intoxication to provide a defense to a criminal charge. 
However, any enhancement which acts on the body’s own functions, for 
example by adjusting body chemistry or genetics to create an ability within 
an individual to trigger increased levels of adrenaline or other neurochemi-
cals at a later time, would not give rise to the defense of intoxication as the 
intoxicating agent would be a naturally formed (endogenic) substance.188 
The defense of intoxication is not available in circumstances where the 
individual was voluntarily intoxicated when they either knew or disregarded 
the risk that they would likely engage in conduct constituting a crime.189 
There is a very real question to be considered on whether the taking of an 
enhancement drug which can mean success or failure of the mission—and 
in some cases literally the difference between life and death—can ever be 
considered truly voluntary in a hierarchical military system. This echoes the 
arguments about true informed consent in the military setting.190 There is 
certainly evidence of the pressure on U.S. troops to take drugs (both for 
performance enhancement in the case of Air Force pilots and prophylacti-
cally in the case of anthrax vaccines for ground troops in Iraq), indicating 
that the voluntary nature of such enhancements could be called into ques-
tion.191 Even if the defense is available, then clearly the question of whether 
                                                                                                                      
187. COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 159, at 876–77. 
188. Id. For an historical example, see the Viking berserker’s legendary fighting frenzy 
which appeared to leave them impervious to pain and with heightened physical ability on 
the battlefield. There are different theories about its origins. Ingestion of fly agaric mush-
rooms or the bog myrtle plant would speak to the availability of the intoxication defense 
(albeit negated by its voluntary consumption), however, a self-induced frenzy or hysteria 
(another of the theories) would not. 
189. Rome Statute, supra note 175, art. 31(1)(b). 
190. Not only are the stakes much higher in terms of mission success, but the lives at 
stake are not only those of the individuals taking the drugs. LIN, MEHLMAN & ABNEY, 
supra note 22; Michael L. Gross, Military Medical Ethics: A Review of the Literature and a Call to 
Arms, 22 CAMBRIDGE QUARTERLY OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 92 (2013). 
191. The consent form for U.S. Air Force pilots using dexedrine states that pilots may 
be grounded for “safety reasons” in the event that they refuse to carry the pills. See supra 
note 106 and accompanying text. The two pilots in the Tarnak farms incident also stated 
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the enhancement (whether pharmaceutical, implant or otherwise) affected 
the soldiers capacity or control to a sufficient degree such as to relieve 
them of criminal responsibility is a factual question that would have to be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis depending on the particular enhancement 
involved and the individual’s reaction to it.  
In either event, it is not sufficient that the defect or intoxication merely 
diminishes the person’s capacity of appreciation or control; it must destroy 
the person’s ability to realize that he or she is acting unlawfully or, if the 
person is aware of the unlawfulness of the conduct, lacks the ability to con-
trol it according to the requirements of the law.192 
A more likely outcome in criminal trials where the use of enhancement 
technology by military personnel is implicated is the argument that the use 
of the enhancement diminishes, rather than negates, the responsibility of 
the personnel involved. The “special defense” of diminished responsibility 
is provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC,193 and 
the rules of both the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR).194 It provides for a plea of “substantially diminished mental capaci-
ty” as a mitigating circumstance in determining a sentence. As the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber in Čelebići noted, unlike the insanity defense that requires 
destruction of the defendant’s mental capacity, the mere impairment of 
                                                                                                                      
that they felt pressure to take the pills, citing fear that they would be “scrubbed from the 
mission” if they did not do so. Shanker & Duenwald, supra note 90. 
192. COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 159, at 547. 
193. International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence r. 145(2), ICC-
ASP/1/3 (part II-A) (2002) (“In addition to the factors mentioned above, the Court shall 
take into account, as appropriate: (a) Mitigating circumstances such as: (i) The circum-
stances falling short of constituting grounds for exclusion of criminal responsibility, such 
as substantially diminished mental capacity or duress . . . .”). See also Rome Statute, supra 
note 175, art. 78(1). 
194. Rule 67(a)(ii)(b) of the rules of procedure and evidence for both the ICTY and 
ICTR provide, “Within the time-limit prescribed by the Trial Chamber or by the pre-trial 
Judge appointed pursuant to Rule 65 ter: (i) the defence shall notify the Prosecutor of its 
intent to offer: (b) any special defence, including that of diminished or lack of mental 
responsibility.” See respectively International Tribunal for the Prosecutions of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. 
IT/32/Rev. 50 (July 8, 2015) (as amended, originally adopted Feb 11, 1994); International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, (May 13, 2015) (as 
amended, originally adopted June 29, 1995). 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2016 
482 
 
 
 
 
 
 
that capacity does not provide a complete defense to the charge leading to 
an acquittal.195  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Human enhancement techniques offer a tantalizing prospect for counter-
acting human frailty on the battlefield. For example, soldiers who need less 
sleep, can see clearly in the dark without bulky headwear or can run over 
rocky terrain for miles without getting fatigued, all offer measurable mili-
tary advantages for the fighting force. However, the utilization of the more 
ambitious of these technologies also risks removing one of the real 
strengths of armed forces personnel—their humanity. The law of armed 
conflict allows soldiers to kill an enemy at one moment and obliges them 
to offer compassion and humane treatment in the next when that same 
enemy is not killed but is wounded or captured. Technologies which inter-
fere with the ability to make that switch must be treated cautiously, taking 
into regard all the possible ramifications of their use. At the same time, 
there are not only risks associated with human enhancement techniques as 
far as compliance with the law of armed conflict is concerned, but also 
potential benefits. Techniques that would allow for the suppression or con-
trol of sentiments such as fear and revenge may also promote compliance. 
As with many other military technologies, the implications of human en-
hancement techniques for the law of armed conflict are not inherent in the 
development and fielding of the technology itself, but rather will depend 
on how they are designed and used. An equally serious legal issue to con-
sider is that of the human rights implications of enhancement techniques 
for soldiers who are required or requested to undergo such enhancement, 
not only during their service in the armed forces, but also in their reintegra-
tion into society as they return to civilian life. 
 
                                                                                                                      
195. Prosecutor v Delalić et al., (‘Čelebići Case’), Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal 
Judgement, ¶ 590 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001). 
